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Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach
When We Teach Posner
Kate O’Neill

∗

It is not, in short, a good judicial opinion. It is merely the greatest judicial opinion of the last hundred years. To judge it by “scientific” standards
is to miss the point. It is a rhetorical masterpiece, and evidently rhetoric
1
counts in law; otherwise the dissent in Lochner would be forgotten.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Evidently, rhetoric does count; otherwise we would not be teach2
ing so many opinions by Judge Richard A. Posner. This Essay will
argue that Judge Posner uses certain rhetorical strategies to attract
casebook editors and law professors to his opinions, and that the edi3
tors and professors happily succumb. As Judge Posner might say,
“There is no crime in that.” The frequency with which his opinions
∗
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1
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 285–86
(1988).
2
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, appointed by
Ronald Reagan in 1981. The University of Chicago: The Law School, Faculty,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). He
served as Chief Judge from 1993 to 2000. Id. From 1969 until his appointment, he
was a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, and he continues to teach as a
Senior Lecturer there. Id. Judge Posner is also one of the founding scholars of the
“law and economics” movement. See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007).
3
One reason for Judge Posner’s particular appeal now is that university law faculties face allegedly competing demands to develop a more sophisticated theoretical
discipline and to teach professional practice. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 4–7 (2007) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE
REPORT]. As a judge with major scholarly credentials, Judge Posner has been able to
create a body of didactic literature in a genre that enables his audience to meet, or
seem to meet, both demands efficiently—as he might say.
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appear in the casebooks simply shows that they meet some demand in
the market for legal educational texts.
4
In this Essay I reflect about the nature of that demand and
about why a kind of symbiosis has developed between this particular
5
judge and the legal academy, and what that symbiosis might tell us
6
about legal education today. I suspect that most law faculty assume
Judge Posner’s opinions are anthologized because they provide examples, often controversial, of economic instrumentalism in judging,
and they happen to be unusually clear and even entertainingly written. I also suspect that most faculty feel reasonably comfortable dealing with Judge Posner’s opinions on the merits, whether or not they
approve of his judicial philosophy or his particular resolution of a
case. The volume of scholarship devoted to the merits of Judge Posner’s opinions suggests such comfort.
My focus is different. I think Judge Posner’s rhetoric, not his
economic analysis, is the principal reason his opinions are so commonly anthologized for students. His rhetoric not only presents the
substantive analysis in an intriguing way but also is itself a major part
of the lesson students absorb. Just as Justice Holmes’s rhetoric in
7
8
Lochner ultimately changed minds and the law, so too, I think, Judge
Posner’s rhetoric may change minds and the law. His rhetoric powerfully conveys attitudes about law and society that go well beyond a
calculus of economic efficiency. Yet, I will argue that these lessons
are rarely identified, much less critiqued, in the typical law school
classroom because most law professors focus on teaching doctrine
and lack the training or supporting materials for engaging in rhetorical analysis. This Essay provides some of those materials and references for those who would like to try such an approach.
Judge Posner’s rhetoric is a good chunk of his message, not just
the means by which he conveys it. When the author is as skilled in
rhetoric as Judge Posner, law professors’ inattention to rhetoric allows students, and perhaps faculty as well, to receive more information than they may consciously perceive as being communicated.
Such inattention may produce lawyers who are less skilled in critical
reading and less conscious of persuasive rhetorical strategies than
they should be.
4

See infra Part IV.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1379, 1388–91 (1995).
6
See infra Part IV.
7
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 394 (1990).
5
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Casebooks do not just ignore rhetoric’s importance; they actively
camouflage it. Judge Posner constructs many of his opinions as educational texts for law students and faculty, but casebook editors present them as if they were judicial opinions like any other—written
primarily to justify a judgment in a case. Thus, at least from the student’s point of view, they are cloaked in authority that a substantively
identical essay would lack. I will argue that, as a result, Judge Posner
is not only influencing several generations of lawyers in their understanding of legal doctrine but is also normalizing for them a specific
judicial rhetorical approach to legal controversies.
I do not intend this Essay as yet another critique of Judge Posner’s economic theories or of his judging, although some criticism of
both may be inferred from my analysis of his rhetoric. Instead, my
principal target is the modern legal academy’s neglect of rhetoric as a
subject worth studying. That Judge Posner’s success in casebooks is
cursorily and commonly attributed to his stature in law and economics or to his ability to “write well” is an especially vivid example of a
long-standing bad habit of discounting authorship, context, and rhetoric in favor of doctrinal coverage in law schools.
This Essay is meant to inspire more interest in law and rhetoric
as a focus of direct inquiry—rather than as a marginal topic or a skill
confined to a first-year legal writing class—and bring a new perspective to the eternal debate about what law students should learn in law
9
school.
Part II of this Essay summarizes my argument. Part III explains
Judge Posner’s marked interest in rhetoric and connects that interest
to his upbringing, his pragmatic theory of judging, and his preference for economic rationales. Part IV explains why Judge Posner’s
rhetorical strategies make his opinions so attractive to casebook editors and law professors. Part V describes three enriching rhetorical
topics that professors could use to direct law students’ attention to
Judge Posner’s strategies. Part V also devotes particular attention to
9

See, e.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4. This report was sponsored by
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and is commonly called
the Carnegie Report. Id. at 3. Although the Carnegie Report recommends significant
changes to other aspects of legal education in U.S. law schools, it characterizes the
“case dialogue” as the “signature pedagogy” and approves its continuing use at least
in the first-year curriculum. Id. at 47–86. That pedagogy is tied to the use of traditional casebooks—which is to say it is tied to teaching materials that are usually focused on legal doctrinal coverage and include modest, if any, attention to judicial biography, intellectual history, or rhetoric. I think the Carnegie Report’s analysis of this
aspect of the first-year curriculum is unfortunately superficial. But see ELIZABETH
MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007)
(documenting and critiquing the classroom dialogues in eight law school courses).
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some contracts cases that I have taught, but I include examples from
cases ranging from administrative law, to civil rights, to bankruptcy,
that illustrate how a relatively basic rhetorical analysis can improve
students’ understanding of cases in any subject area. Part VI rounds
out my initial argument with some general conclusions.
II. OVERVIEW
Judge Posner achieved his twenty-fifth anniversary on the bench
10
in 2006. The following year, to honor him, the Harvard Law Review
11
and the University of Chicago Law Review dedicated issues to faculty
comments on his opinions. Dean Elena Kagan introduces Harvard’s
issue with this:
As Judge Posner’s opinions lend themselves to commentary, so
too do they lend themselves to instruction. Rifle through the
pages of whatever casebook you have at hand (nearly any subject,
common law or statutory, will do) and you will find a grossly disproportionate number of Posner opinions. Perhaps consciously,
perhaps not, Judge Posner writes for the casebooks: for two and a
half decades, he has produced simply remarkable teaching materials. Love them, hate them, agree or disagree with them, Judge
Posner’s opinions make people think—about what the law is doing, about what the law should be doing, about why it all mat12
ters.

As Dean Kagan’s introduction reveals, Judge and Professor Richard
A. Posner has become an “academics’ darling,” to borrow the term he
used to describe Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his 1990 monograph
13
on Justice Cardozo’s reputation. In his monograph, Judge Posner
explained that a judge can build an enduring reputation like Justice
Cardozo’s, at least in part, by writing opinions that appeal to case14
book editors and law professors. The monograph is principally a
10

Commentaries: Twenty-Five Years of Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1121 (2007).
11
Special Issue Commemorating Twenty-Five Years of Judge Richard A. Posner, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1641 (2007).
12
Elena Kagan, Commentary, Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1121,
1122 (2007).
13
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 91 (1990). In describing
Justice Cardozo as “an academics’ darling,” Judge Posner refers to the extraordinary
number of Justice Cardozo’s opinions in torts and contracts casebooks. Id. at 90–91.
14
Id. at 89–91. See also Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1388–91; David A. Logan,
The Man in the Mirror, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1739, 1739–40 (1992) (citing POSNER, supra
note 13, at vii); David Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability:
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1210,
1221–22 (2007).
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study of Justice Cardozo’s rhetoric and its effect on building his repu15
tation.
This Essay analyzes Judge Posner’s academic audience as much
as it does his rhetoric. I argue that Judge Posner’s distinctive rhetorical strategies explain why casebook editors and law professors have afforded this living judge such a fulsome reception, and I criticize the
legal academy nevertheless for focusing almost exclusively on the legal analysis of his opinions rather than on his rhetorical strategies or
the subtexts they may convey. Is this a feedback loop in which one of
the legal academy’s graduates and stellar scholars now supplies it with
teaching materials? That would be unremarkable in a graduate discipline like economics, but it is unusual in legal education. That may
not be a bad thing, but it is certainly worth examining. It is true that
Judge Posner writes well, but that is often the beginning and the end
of the rhetorical analysis as we quickly move on to examine his economic theories, his pragmatic instrumentalism, or his revision of a
precedent’s significance. Given Judge Posner’s reputation as a scholar of economic analysis of law and the economic rationales in his
opinions, many law professors probably think it inevitable that his
16
opinions should appear in their casebooks, and surely casebook edi[T]he future lies in the minds of students, and I surmise that they are
the principal audience for Posner’s opinion. The nature of legal education today (and yesterday) is such that students’ exposure to the
leading functionalist literature—or any scholarly work for that matter—is usually limited to snippets in casebook notes. For Posner to get
more of his message across to students, then, he must do it through his
opinions, having them published (albeit excerpted) in casebooks and
his arguments (qua judicial rulings) mooted in class.
Id. at 1222.
15
POSNER, supra note 13, at vii. The book provides an excellent introduction to
Judge Posner’s own rhetorical techniques, discussed more infra Part III.
16
See Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1391. By 1995 Judge Posner had climbed to
the top of the small list of judges whose opinions are frequently anthologized. As of
1994 Judge Posner’s contracts opinions appeared in casebooks at an average rate of
2.46 per casebook. Id. at 1384–90. Only Justice Cardozo, with 4.07 per casebook,
and Judge Roger J. Traynor with 2.62 (both deceased by 1994) surpassed him. Id.
The economic analyses in Judge Posner’s opinions, however, are frequently criticized. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1141–47
(2007) (critiquing Judge Posner for failing to account for multiple factors that might
affect optimal choice-of-law rules); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”:
Posner as Political Economist, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1873, 1878 (2007) (critiquing Judge
Posner’s concurring opinion in Chicago Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732,
741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring)); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis
Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic
Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 1895–96, 1901–09 (2007) (critiquing Judge Posner’s
“casual empiricism” and challenging the Posnerian claim that economic rationales
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tors want to signal that their latest edition is au courant with what
Anthony Kronman has described as “the intellectual movement that
has had the greatest influence on American academic law in the past
18
quarter century.”
Because opinions can rarely accommodate significant theoretical
analyses, it might be more accurate to say that opinions in casebooks
can at most convey an attitude toward the use of economic rationales
(or any other rationale for that matter) in judging, and that attitude
is what casebook editors and professors hope to project and perhaps
to critique. A more considered reflection on Judge Posner’s success
in the casebooks provokes some interesting thoughts about why his
opinions crop up so frequently. Is it possible that Judge Posner is
useful and perhaps even reassuring to legal educators because he
represents an iconic judicial type in the ideology of American lawyering—the smart, erudite, articulate, witty change-agent? He revitalizes
our preferred teaching materials with refreshing craft and, often, new
19
meaning. Some of his opinions are like art; he re-envisions the law,
stripping away the accretions of lesser artists, revealing the deep
structures beneath and recasting conventional wisdom into shiny,
new forms. His opinions supply a whiff of interdisciplinary theory
are less subject to rhetorical manipulation than others; asserting that at least in the
manner used by the judiciary, “cost-benefit analysis also has potential vices. It can
operate as a vessel for unreliable intuitions rather than a way of disciplining them,
and it can fail to take account of an important aspect of discrimination, consisting of
the daily humiliations of exclusion and stigmatization.”); Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability
Versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1912, 1922–31 (2007)
(critiquing Judge Posner’s analysis in light of “modern economic learning on the
choice between strict liability and negligence”). Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and
Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148, 1154, 1157, 1160 (2007) (praising Judge
Posner for having taken a step in the “right direction” regarding indirect tort liability
that was frustrated in part by the Supreme Court’s later rationale, and commenting
with particular relevance to my topic, that “[t]he full potential, and indeed reality, of
indirect liability as a legal and nonlegal regulatory strategy may have been masked by
moralistic and legalistic aversions to deviations from the direct liability norm of sanctioning the intuitively primary wrongdoer”).
17
Fashions in casebooks no doubt lag behind theory, in part because theory may
never appear in opinions because the judiciary is constrained by precedent.
18
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 166 (1993). Readers who are interested in pursuing the issues I discuss
here should find Kronman’s chapter on law schools worth reading, or rereading.
Among other points, he captures the tension in legal education between the demands of theoretical and interdisciplinary scholarship and the “prudentialist” traditions associated with examining and teaching the common law. See id. at 165–270.
Teaching Judge Posner’s opinions may relieve that tension a bit.
19
For a lay parallel and bestseller, see STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER,
FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING
(2005).
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just when law faculties are most anxious that other university faculties
view law schools as mere a-theoretical trade schools. Judge Posner is
the consummate insider in a conservative profession and a discipline
20
that cherishes the occasional irreverent iconoclast. He is fresh yet
familiar. For all that he has done to influence doctrine and theory,
he nonetheless validates the century-old law school devotion to teaching appellate opinions.
It takes two to tango: it takes an author and an audience to create a publishing and academic phenomenon. I suspect Judge Posner
understands his academic audience better than the audience understands itself. Judge Posner understands that legal education involves
immersion in a very select literature of the law, not “the law.” There is
a canon, and within the canon at any given time the most entertaining and accessible writers will be most influential. Judge Posner has
deliberately and self-consciously created a body of didactic literature
in his opinions—a canon update, if you will. There’s no law against
that. If this phenomenon seems to threaten some separation of pow21
ers between academia and the judiciary, the casebook editors and
professors must be responsible for buying the goods. Nobody is required to teach Judge Posner’s opinions.
But enough about the faculty! What about the students? Whatever impact Judge Posner may ultimately have on legal doctrine and
theory, his substantial presence in the casebooks is bound to impress
several generations of lawyers. Judge Posner’s enduring significance
may be in what his opinions—with the law schools’ help—teach new
22
lawyers about the law, about values, and about the use of rhetoric.
20

I deliberately treat Judge Posner simultaneously as an icon and as an iconoclast. Persuasive iconoclasts, unlike merely overpowering ones, are endowed with
some credibility.
21
See POSNER, supra note 13, at 133 (The criteria of academic excellence and judicial effectiveness are not co-extensive: “Then, too, the audience for judicial opinions is not primarily an academic one. . . . [T]he judge who wants to be effective is
constrained for the most part to operate incrementally, respecting distinctions, precedents, traditions, and whatnot that make the professor justifiably impatient.”).
22
Rhetorical analysis considers much more than style. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF RHETORIC (Thomas O. Sloane ed., 2001). Judge Posner’s style and other rhetorical characteristics deserve more scholarly attention than they have yet received.
Judge Posner may be the leading authority on his own rhetorical strategies. See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421
(1995). The aforementioned article appears within an issue devoted almost entirely
to judicial opinion writing. Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1363
(1995).
Readers interested generally in judicial rhetoric may find two recent works
worthwhile. Judicial opinions’ content, style, and legal significance in the AngloAmerican tradition have varied significantly over time. For a fascinating argument
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In Part V, I consider three rhetorical strategies Judge Posner
commonly uses: citation of seminal authorities, distinctive organizational techniques, and colloquial style. Judge Posner’s style—
colloquial word choice, occasional sentence fragments, and so
forth—probably attracts the most attention and makes most of his
opinions instantly recognizable to experienced readers. The impact
is heightened if an opinion is read in isolation or mixed in with opinions by other judges. The impact of Judge Posner’s distinctive style is
diluted, however, if one reads a number of his opinions together.
Then one can see that this prolific writer efficiently reuses some
techniques and that his opinions reveal remarkable stylistic consistency. Nevertheless, style alone does not account for his opinions’
popularity as teaching vehicles.
To most students, Judge Posner’s writing must sparkle with clarity and modernity, at least in comparison to most of the assigned
reading. Here are two examples, the first from a very recent case and
the second from a case that has been the subject of substantial doctrinal critique that is discussed in more detail below.
(1) “Constructive trust” is legalese for seeking to wrest ownership
of a thing from its nominal owner, which is to say the holder of
legal title. It is not a real trust; in law, “constructive” often and
23
here means “fictional.”

and
(2) If you extract a promise by means of a threat, the promise is
unenforceable. That is not, as so often stated because such a
promise is involuntary unless “involuntary” is a conclusion rather
than the description of a mental state. If the threat is ferocious
(“your money or your life”) and believed, the victim may be desperately eager to fend it off with a promise. Such promises are
made unenforceable in order to discourage threats by making
them less profitable. The fundamental issue in a duress case is
therefore not the victim’s state of mind but whether the statement

that opinions were once, and could become again, distinct from the precedential
significance of the judgment, see Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1226–27, 1273 (2007). For an interesting hypothesis that
Judge Posner’s ability to use informal organizational structures and colloquial language while maintaining an authoritative tone is due to the current security, stability,
and power of the federal courts, see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL
OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 108–26 (2007).
23
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 499, 501 (7th Cir.
2007) (Posner, J.).
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that induced the promise is the kind of offer to deal that we want
24
to discourage, and hence that we call a “threat.”

Just these two examples contain good, practical lessons about writing
well for the audience if professors would draw students’ attention to
the short sentences and frank, funny, anti-legalese of the first and the
25
colloquial wording and vivid examples of the second.
But in addition to pointing out these examples of craft—
whether or not one likes them—professors could also call students’
attention to the possibility that, like many a great writer, Judge Posner’s writing reflects and conveys some implicit messages. In particular, as I discuss in the next section, Judge Posner’s distinctive rhetorical strategies may arise from a more or less conscious effort to
distance his analysis, by using rhetoric, from some troublesome for26
bearers, especially his mother and Justice Cardozo. While the content of his economic and judging theories, his logic, and his use of
empirical and legal authority are all hotly contested in legal scholarship, and faculty presumably share some of these critiques with students, students will hear little of how Judge Posner’s views may have
been shaped by his time, place, and circumstances and will not un27
I am
derstand these influences unless their professors tell them.
quite sure that few professors devote precious classroom minutes to
deconstructing the rhetorical techniques Judge Posner uses to advance his ideas and attitudes, and little can be discerned from the casebooks. Perhaps Judge Posner’s distortions and omissions of precedent might make it into the typical, doctrinally busy law school

24

Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Posner, J.).
25
Would it be possible to devote some of the legal writing curriculum to close
analysis of Judge Posner’s rhetorical strategies? Could one teach legal method by assigning students the task of writing opinions in his style and then again in the style of
a judge with a different philosophy—perhaps Judge Patricia Wald of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit? Compare Posner, supra note 22, at 1440–
43, with Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375–80 (1995) [hereinafter Rhetoric of Results] and Patricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1451, 1452 (1995) [hereinafter Reply to Judge Posner] (Judge Wald objects, among other things, to Judge Posner’s
manners in criticizing one of her opinions without having provided advanced warning: “Wow! What has happened to the vaunted Seventh Circuit civility? An out-oftown guest is invited to sup at the master’s table, only to find she is the main
course.”).
26
See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY 10 (1973)
(explaining the literary theory that each new poet must supplant his predecessors).
27
See MERTZ, supra note 9, at 75–79 (describing the contrast in the classroom dialogue between the professor’s insistence on precise dissection of doctrine and tolerance of airy policy discussions).
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classroom, but even that may be unlikely because students would have
to have read the precedents and they do not have time. Judge Posner
is free—enabled by academics—to play the daring free-thinker, to restate the literature of the law in his own vivid and persuasive terms,
while he is presented in casebooks as just one more work-a-day jurist.
I suspect Judge Posner has and will continue to have quite an
impact on students’ attitudes and expressive tones, and especially on
their sense of what it means to be an elite legal professional. Most
students are ill-equipped by prior education to detect subtexts. If
professors do not draw students’ attention to these subtexts, I do not
see how students can do anything but accept the apparent approbation from the unusual frequency of his opinions. The way a judicial
icon writes his way into academic iconicity is an important lesson, at
least as long as law schools teach principally with appellate opinions.
In the balance of this Essay, I will suggest some of the implicit
messages conveyed by our fondness for teaching this erudite, understandable, and coolly persuasive judicial writer. By attending to what
seems natural, but has been carefully constructed, I hope to illuminate some dimly perceived aspects of our academic culture. A pedagogy that fails to contextualize an intellect like Judge Posner’s and to
attend to his rhetorical skills is undertheorized. To that end, in the
next Part, I will describe a little of Judge Posner’s personal background with the goal of explaining why he might be particularly interested in altering some inherited rhetorical conventions of the legal
profession on his way to changing minds.
III. WHY RHETORIC INTERESTS JUDGE POSNER
Judge Posner has long acknowledged that appellate judges have
considerable, but not unlimited, discretion in interpreting and apply28
ing the law. He also thinks that a skilled writer may be able to per29
suade audiences to believe what they might not otherwise believe.
The combination means that a judge, who is a skilled writer, may persuade himself and other judges, lawyers, and the public, that a deci30
sion is wise despite not having very good reasons for it. Judge Posner seems to believe that economic reasons, however, can curb a
judge’s ability to be confused by his own rhetoric:
There is a broad area in which judges can properly bring economics to bear on law, but they cannot make it the sole guide to their
28

E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Case Against Strict Constructionism: What Am I? A
Potted Plant?, THE NEW REPUBLIC 23 (Sept. 18, 1987).
29
See infra note 46.
30
See infra pp 117–21 and accompanying notes.

O'NEILL (FINAL)

2009]

4/6/2009 11:17:41 PM

RHETORIC COUNTS

517

job; more important, the language of economics will not conceal
from them what they are doing when they use economics to make
31
or change the law.

Others have observed, however, that the use of economic analysis is itself a rhetorical strategy so that Judge Posner’s hope that economic analysis may restrain the excesses of judicial discretion and
rhetorical prowess may be in vain:
The whole of normative law and economics is to that extent
shaped by an ideal of clarity in moral argument, and by a confidence in the resolving power of certain methodical techniques,
that are antithetical to the prudentialist tradition and to the
claims of practical wisdom. The claim that there is no cleanedged method for resolving moral disputes and that many questions of this kind have no principled answer at all has its roots in
the experience of incommensurability as a fact of moral life. It is
the phenomenon of incommensurability that most forcefully suggests the need for practical wisdom in deliberation, and that
compels us to ask what prudence is. But the phenomenon of incommensurability is invisible from an economic point of view.
For the assertion that all moral controversies can be resolved by
applying to them the single standard of efficiency (whatever the
philosophical justification for doing so may be) implies that real
incommensurabilities do not exist and, where they seem to,
32
should be treated as illusions that clear thinking will dissolve.

31

POSNER, supra note 1, at 314.
KRONMAN, supra note 18, at 237–38. For an interesting and informative intellectual history and an argument that “law and economics” is but an instance of a persistent preference since the Enlightenment for scientific ways of knowing and reasoning in Anglo-American legal culture, see generally JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER
COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR
OBJECTIVITY (2007). Hackney discusses Judge Posner at some length, emphasizing
his role as a “popularizer” of economic analysis in law and arguing that Judge Posner
has evolved from an economic formalist to a pragmatist. Id. at 108–71, 209–10 n.132.
For a critique of Judge Posner’s preference for the methodology of economics by a
leading pragmatist, see RICHARD RORTY, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 93 (1999), and RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism and
Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 104 (1999). See also Brian Leiter, Science and
Morality: Pragmatic Reflections on Rorty’s “Pragmatism”, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2007);
Martha Nussbaum, On Moral Progress: A Response to Richard Rorty, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
939 (2007); Richard Rorty, Dewey and Posner on Pragmatism and Moral Progress, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 915 (2007). For two different approaches to Judge Posner’s views on
economic analysis and pragmatism, see Martha Minow, Religion and the Burden of
Proof: Posner’s Economics and Pragmastism in Metzle v. Leininger, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1175 (2007), and Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 384–
428 (1985). For Judge Posner’s own views on pragmatism, economic analysis, and
morals, see POSNER, supra note 8; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL
32
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Posner’s intriguing monograph on Cardozo considers the effect
of persuasive rhetoric on judicial opinions and on judges’ reputa33
tions, and it reveals as much about its author as its subject. I will use
this book, together with a few published bits of biographical informa34
tion about Posner’s childhood, to explain an intuition.
The intuition is this: I think Judge Posner’s suspicion of “moralism” and moralistic rhetoric predates his devotion to arguments
based on economic instrumentalism. The suspicion may actually
drive him to the economic arguments. This is the reverse of what
some critics say—his devotion to economic efficiency arguments
35
makes him discount other values. I suspect it was the persistent moralistic rhetoric of his mother, and people he associates with her
views, that sent him to the market. That is not such a remarkable insight. After all, many people of Judge Posner’s generation—growing
up in the 1940s and 1950s, mature and educated before the late
1960s—thought the Soviet Union a horrible oppressor and became
skeptical about the costs and the efficacy of domestic social uplift
agendas. That the economic theories associated with the Chicago
School from the 1950s through the 1980s should have offered Judge
Posner an intellectual haven is hardly surprising. Judge Posner is remarkable not for the novelty of his ideology but for his intelligence,
his rhetorical skills, and his contribution to transplanting economics
into law. To understand that, students need some exposure to biographical, intellectual, and social history, which doctrinal casebooks
do not impart.
Judge Posner came of age during the Cold War. From Judge
Posner himself, we have a little information that he came to regard
his parents’ socialism or communism, especially his mother’s, as sog36
gy sentimentality. Not just soggy, but stupid, dangerous, perhaps
LEGAL THEORY (1999) [hereinafter PROBLEMATICS]; and RICHARD A. POSNER, So
What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law, in OVERCOMING LAW 388 (1995).
33
See generally POSNER, supra note 13. Others have noticed this intersection of author and subject. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1380; Logan, supra note 14,
at 1739.
34
Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner: An Interview with Richard Posner, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 78.
35
See generally RORTY, supra note 32; Nussbaum, supra note 32; Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1409 (arguing that Judge Posner turns Justice Cardozo’s moralistic understanding of good faith in contract performance “upside down”).
36
MacFarquhar writes:
When Posner grew more conservative (he thought of himself as a liberal until he was thirty or so), his mother was horrified. “We had terrible fights,” he says. “I became really furious at her. See, she was one of
these bright fools, my mother—quite a bright person, but very limited.
The other thing that annoyed me about her was that I worried about
AND
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37

even murderous, sentimentality. Like many in his generation, he
came to deplore those fellow travelers who failed to perceive the Soviet Union’s brutal oppression of its own subjects, and who persisted
without any empirical support even in the face of much empirical
contradiction, in thinking that a communist ideology, or some variant, represented hope for the poor and downtrodden, rather than
the greatest threat to western, individual liberties in the twentieth
century after the Third Reich. The economic expansion of the United States after the Second World War and the eventual collapse of
the Soviet Union seemed to validate the superiority of the U.S. politi38
cal economy—if it could be preserved from blinkered do-gooders.
her politics interfering with my career. Every time I got a government
job, I always felt obligated to tell the authorities that I had this mother
who had probably been a Communist. It was an annoying piece of
baggage. Then eventually she became senile and forgot about politics
and actually became very benign. Both [my wife] Charlene and I
breathed a sigh of relief.” Looking back on his red-diaper childhood,
Posner considers his parents hypocrites. “It was just talk,” he says of
their radicalism. “They wanted me to live the same conventional life
that they lived.”
....
“I don’t know if this is true of everybody,” Posner says, “but I loved
my parents when I was growing up and they were really the sort of parents you should be grateful to—my mother gave me great cultural enrichment, and my father helped me buy our first house, so they were
ideal parents.”
....
Martha Nussbaum, a philosopher at the University of Chicago and a
friend of Posner’s, believes that his upbringing and his pious, Communist mother are the reason that he is now repelled by moralism of any
kind, and takes refuge in literature. He loves scandalous, immoralist
writers such as Stendhal and Gide, and indeed, the world of French
novels is in many ways more congenial to Posner’s caustic temperament, and to an economic, self-interested view of human nature, than
that of the law.
MacFarquhar, supra note 34, at 83–84.
37
MacFarquhar reports a family history that seems loaded with possible tensions
about issues of morality, justice, law, politics, and finances.
His mother was a Communist and was friendly with the family that
adopted the Rosenberg children. The day Stalin died was a day of
mourning in the Posner household. His father had a checkered career: as a young man, he worked in a jewelry business with some cousins; then, having attended law school at night, he became a criminaldefense lawyer. After the Second World War, he became a moneylender, specializing in second mortgages in New York slums; he was so
successful at this that he bought a Cadillac and, in 1948, moved his
family to Scarsdale.
Id. at 83.
38
For a collection of essays on major cultural figures of the twentieth century
that reflects this post-WWII zeitgeist within certain circles in the western “liberal de-
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The underlying issues here are not trivial, and they have bedeviled jurisprudence since the realists poked holes in legal actors’
39
claims to objectivity and since H.L.A. Hart’s positivism took a body
40
blow from the Third Reich.
One could argue that both Hitler’s
Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union owed a good deal of their
41
powers to the abuse of reason and morality through rhetoric.
It would be a small step to conclude that rhetoric is the problem,
and that sentimentality—which can be hard to distinguish from moralism—clothed in rhetoric is an even bigger problem. As a juvenile,
Judge Posner might have elided his mother’s politics with her gift to
42
him of a love of literature. Perhaps as a result, his early love of literature, with all the attendant lessons about the power of rhetoric
and remarkable rhetorical gifts seemed to pose some danger that
43
might need to be controlled. Students of literature understand that
rhetoric and authorial bias are inescapable. Add power to the mix,
and you have a potentially serious danger. Judge Posner—the adult
jurisprude—understands this. In an exercise of self-control he might
have decided, consciously or not, to direct his very considerable rhetorical skills toward goals whose attainment could be quantified and
assessed objectively, at least in theory. It could not have hurt that the
United States was triumphant both militarily and economically, and
that a good deal of intellectual fire power was directed toward explaining why and how the successes could be improved upon. Therefore, Judge Posner might have found a solution to rhetorical anxiety
in economic methodology.
Judge Posner seems both intrigued and disturbed by what the
study of literature taught him about the power of rhetoric to make
people do and believe things that they might not otherwise do or be-

mocracies,” see CLIVE JAMES, CULTURAL AMNESIA: NECESSARY MEMORIES FROM HISTORY
AND THE ARTS (2007).
39
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
40
See POSNER, supra note 8, at 228–39.
41
See, e.g., RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
LITERATURE 127–87 (1992) (including a discussion of the Nazis’ use of legalistic rhetoric to abuse Jewish people and others).
42
POSNER, supra note 1, at v. (“For my mother, who initiated me into the pleasures of literature, and my father, who encouraged me to go to law school.”).
43
MacFarquhar, supra note 34, at 86 (reporting that Judge Posner studied English at Yale with Cleanth Brooks, a noted scholar associated with the New Criticism
movement, and that Judge Posner was attracted to Nietzsche for the view that “a person is responsible for his own life” and that “we have no right to blame anyone else
for the result because it was ours to make or muff”). I speculate on the relevance of
New Criticism to Judge Posner’s approach to legal education in the final part of this
Essay.
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44

lieve. For example, in Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation,
45
In that
he devotes a chapter to the Judicial Opinion as Literature.
chapter, he pays particular attention to the Yeats poem, “The Second
Coming,” and examines how Yeats seems to produce an attitude or
belief in readers that is not borne out by the literal meaning of the
46
Judge Posner goes on to examine the funeral
words written.
speeches by Brutus and Antony in Act III of Shakespeare’s Julius Cae-

44

All literature employs rhetoric, and rhetoric may be literary, but not necessarily. Both words have a broad range of meanings. In this context, by “literature”
Judge Posner and I are referring to the broad category of literature that is “imaginative or creative writing, especially of recognized artistic value” and to the narrower
category of professional or disciplinary literature comprised of judicial opinions.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1050 (3d ed. 1992).
“Rhetoric” is the “art or study of using language effectively and persuasively.” Id. at
1547. This dictionary contains a pertinent usage note:
The word rhetoric was once primarily the name of an important branch
of philosophy and an art deserving of serious study. In recent years the
word has come to be used chiefly in a pejorative sense to refer to inflated language and pomposity. Deprecation of the term may result
from a modern linguistic Puritanism, which holds that language used
in legitimate persuasion should be plain and free of artifice—itself a
tendentious rhetorical doctrine, though not often recognized as such.
But many writers still prefer to bear in mind the traditional meanings
of the word. Thus, according to the newer use of the term, the phrase
empty rhetoric, as in The politicians talk about solutions, but they usually offer
only empty rhetoric, might be construed as redundant. But in fact only 35
percent of the Usage Panel judged this example to be redundant. Presumably, it can be maintained that rhetoric can be other than empty.
Id. This usage note is reminiscent of the contest between Barack Obama and Hillary
Clinton for the Democratic presidential nomination in which the question of whether Obama’s oratorical eloquence indicated his capacity for leadership or was merely
“empty rhetoric.”
45
POSNER, supra note 1, at 269–316.
46
Id. at 275–76. Judge Posner writes,
How can a writer persuade, without an effort at logical or empirical
proof? The answer is that in areas of uncertainty, areas not yet conquered by logic or science, we are open to persuasion by all sorts of
methods, some remote from logic and science. It is not that people are
irrational; it is that when unable to obtain direct confirmation of an assertion they do not just suspend judgment—they seek indirect confirmation or refutation.
Id. In light of this comment, it is interesting to read Richard Rorty’s argument that
Judge Posner has rejected “the idea that we have made moral progress” and that this
rejection is “a relapse from the true pragmatist faith into positivistic science-worship.”
Rorty, supra note 32, at 918–19 (discussing POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 32, at
4–6). See also Nussbaum, supra note 32, at 939 (agreeing “with Rorty against Posner”
that there is moral progress). But see Leiter, supra note 32, at 929 (disputing Rorty’s
view of pragmatism). For a historical account of the role of scientific positivism in
Anglo-American legal theory, see HACKNEY, JR., supra note 32, at 27–28, 35–51, 94–
100.
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47

sar. He contrasts how Brutus’s honest but elegantly detached oration fails to persuade the Roman mob, while Antony’s does, despite
48
the fact that “almost everything in this passage is false.” Judge Posner comments that “[n]ot for nothing has Antony’s speech been
49
called ‘an exhibition of the destruction of reason by rhetoric.’” An50
tony “uses emotion rather than reason to make his case.”
These concerns inform Judge Posner’s monograph on Justice
Cardozo. Judge Posner argues that the principal cause of Justice
Cardozo’s judicial reputation was his combination of rhetorical prow51
ess and pragmatism. Before Judge Posner gets to the details, he offers a summary of Justice Cardozo’s life that is quite intriguing for
what it might tell us about the particular rhetorical strategies Judge
Posner uses to promote a non-moralistic, economic variation on Jus52
tice Cardozo’s pragmatism.
After noting that “psychobiography is a controversial genre, and
53
efforts at judicial psychobiography . . . have not been well received,”
Judge Posner first repeats speculation that Justice Cardozo set about
creating an aura of personal “saintliness” to escape the taint of a cor54
ruption scandal that brought down his father’s legal career. Then
he writes this fascinating paragraph:
Scholars of psychiatric bent might, however, want to explore the
possible significance of the fact that Cardozo’s mother died when
he was a child and his father when Cardozo was an adolescent,
and that Cardozo’s twin was a girl. “Patients growing up in families where one or both of the parents died appear more compromised in their interpersonal relationships . . . . These patients are
more likely to have impairments in achieving stable, mature adult
attachments.” Cardozo’s relationship with Nell [his elder sister],
and his (quite possibly related) failure to marry, is consistent with
this observation. As for having a twin of the opposite sex, it has
been suggested that this can result in the “feminizing” of the male
twin and the “masculinizing” of the female. This suggestion
might, if true, help explain Cardozo’s failure to marry. Yet his
twin was his only sibling to marry! I shall not pursue these questions further; the details of Cardozo’s psychology, so far as they
47

POSNER, supra note 1, at 278–81.
Id.
49
Id. at 281 (citing NICHOLAS BROOKE, SHAKESPEARE’S EARLY TRAGEDIES 157
(1968)).
50
Id.
51
POSNER, supra note 13, at 126–28.
52
Id. at 1–19.
53
Id. at 5 n.10.
54
Id. at 5, 8.
48
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are known, seem tenuously, if at all, related to his professional
55
work, which is my interest.

Then why raise these questions in the first place? Judge Posner is too
skilled a writer to have wandered off topic by accident. Instead, the
last sentence is a prolepsis—a rhetorical device for rebutting an ar56
gument before it is even raised. But what would that argument be?
I see three possibilities.
One might question the evidence for Judge Posner’s speculation
about the feminizing effects of Justice Cardozo’s youthful family cir57
cumstances. Judge Posner cites only two references. The second
might question Judge Posner’s implicit message about normal gendered behavior: Judge Posner suggests that these feminizing influences resulted in Justice Cardozo’s failure to marry. The next paragraph notes that Justice Cardozo was “exceedingly polite,” and points
to a particular sign of his politeness in that “he rarely adopted an adversarial stance toward lawyers or lower-court judges, either in person
or in his opinions. . . . Of course he lived in an era when lawyers and
55

Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
The prolepsis shelters Judge Posner’s implicit attitudes about normal maturation from challenge by declaring the paragraph irrelevant and thereby deflecting all
but the most intrepid readers from considering it further. I note it here for two reasons. First, since Judge Posner often writes more than is strictly necessary for resolution of an appeal, he sometimes uses a form of prolepsis to indicate his awareness.
For an example in a recent opinion of Judge Posner’s use of prolepsis to shelter dicta, see Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 808 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
“this is another issue to be considered in the first instance on remand, should its resolution become critical to the outcome”). The Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim prior to discovery for lack of standing and
remanded the case. Much of Judge Posner’s opinion was directed to the merits if
certain facts could be proven. Id. at 800–08. Judge Ripple concurred in the decision
but objected to this “commentary on the merits at this time.” Id. at 808 (Ripple, J.,
concurring). A frank statement that an analysis is dicta can make space for a useful
discussion without confusing lower courts and practitioners. For an interesting discussion about the appropriate and inappropriate use of dicta by the United States
Supreme Court, see Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006).
Second, I dwell on this “aside” about Justice Cardozo’s elective and gendered affinities because I do not think the prolepsis is literally true. Instead, I think the paragraph raises issues that may interest Judge Posner quite a bit. One might be
whether a person without stable, mature, adult attachments would be more or less
likely to build a considerable reputation. Another might be whether such a person
might be inclined (perhaps out of necessity or insecurity) to be more than usually
polite to acquaintances. Perhaps this paragraph implies that Justice Cardozo’s remarkable kindliness may have been the product of imperfect maturation. If so, then
an unwitting reader, indulging in a sloppy negative inference, might infer that a
judge and scholar like Judge Posner, who seems to engage in a fair amount of adversarial behavior on and off the bench, is exhibiting a fully mature personality.
57
POSNER, supra note 13, at 6.
56
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judges—perhaps people in general—were more civil than they are
58
today.” A third might accuse Judge Posner of concealing a stealthy
put-down of his subject—and rival for judicial reputation—in a
breezy, faintly gossipy, summary of his subject’s early years. On first
impression, Judge Posner appears to be impugning Justice Cardozo’s
masculinity while coyly avoiding any explicit endorsement of the
gender stereotypes his writing employs. Upon reflection, however, I
doubt that Judge Posner cares about Justice Cardozo’s masculinity.
Instead, he is up to a subtler business: I think the above quoted paragraph is designed to imply that Justice Cardozo was not fully developed in some way. The significance of such an arrested development
emerges later.
Far from being off topic, Judge Posner is laying the groundwork
for a distinction—that Judge Posner does not suffer from an arrested
development. Despite some similarities in rhetorical prowess, Judge
Posner is not to be lumped with Justice Cardozo. His theory of judging, unlike Justice Cardozo’s, is fully developed.
By calling attention to Justice Cardozo’s rhetorical skills a little
59
later in the book, Judge Posner could have put himself in a tight
spot had he not laid the groundwork for this distinction. Like Justice
Cardozo, he is a skilled judicial rhetorician. Like Justice Cardozo, he
claims to be a pragmatist, unwilling to pretend that judicial decisions
are dictated by application of determinate principles. Like Justice
Cardozo, he has acquired a reputation based in large measure on his
ability to write opinions that garner readers, especially academic
readers. If Judge Posner is not to concede that his opinions are interesting or powerful merely because of his rhetorical gifts, and if he
is to avoid the implication that his own judicial reputation may rest
upon literary talents and not on substantive merit, he must distinguish
himself from Justice Cardozo. Here, I think, is the point of the psychobiography paragraph. Unlike some critics, Judge Posner does not
fault Justice Cardozo’s rhetoric for being too flowery and metaphoric—that is, too rhetorical. He could not do so in good conscience
because, as we shall see, he is an equally deliberate author. Nor does
he fault Justice Cardozo for pragmatism or for manipulating precedent to wriggle free of formalist constraints—he too is a pragmatic instrumentalist more interested in achieving outcomes than in adhering to precedent for its own sake.

58
59

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 47.
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Instead, he criticizes Justice Cardozo’s opinions for a substantive
60
deficiency. In discussing Justice Cardozo’s famous opinion in Hynes
61
v. New York Central Railroad, Judge Posner says that “[n]o reason is
given for the conclusion. . . . In his soaring peroration Cardozo has
given no reason why the plaintiff should win. Again it is Cardozo the
rhetorician, rather than Cardozo the pragmatic policy analyst, the so62
ciological jurisprude, whose hand is visible.”
Judge Posner comments that
neither in Hynes nor elsewhere in Cardozo’s corpus are these
fundamental principles set forth or the ends of law specified.
Cardozo is committed to a pragmatic approach that he frequently
is unable to make operational so that its application can be predicted. He may have had in mind as the shaping principle of law
63
nothing more exciting than public opinion. . . . If weak on policy analysis, Hynes is strong on rhetoric (no thanks to the plaintiff’s sixty-six-page brief, with its seventeen separate argument
headings). But as the term embraces all verbal methods of persuasion, including the emotive and the deceitful, the normative
64
implications of “powerful rhetoric” are equivocal.

Judge Posner is working here to differentiate his own approach to
opinion-writing, trying to preserve the credibility of self-conscious literary techniques to enhance the effectiveness of judicial opinions,
while dealing with the criticism that the judge who uses such techniques may only be enacting his own intuitions under camouflage.
65
He comments on another famous Justice Cardozo opinion:
Palsgraf’s celebrity is due in part . . . to Cardozo’s technique. And
that technique is quintessentially rhetorical in a sense that cannot
be taken as wholly complimentary in evaluating a judicial opinion,
for one element of the technique is the selection of facts with a
freedom bordering on that of a novelist or a short-story writer,
and another is outright fictionalizing (“at the other end of the
platform, many feet away”). Moreover, despite Cardozo’s professed (and, so far as I am able to determine, sincere) pragmatism, his opinion does not come to grips with the issues of policy
that are raised by the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff, and
60

Id. at 38–41.
Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921).
62
POSNER, supra note 13, at 53.
63
It is not clear why deference to public opinion is necessarily inappropriate in a
case where the law is indeterminate. Perhaps Judge Posner thinks such deference is
symptomatic of a failure to fully develop, as in modern adolescents’ alleged concern
with what people think of them.
64
POSNER, supra note 13, at 53–54.
65
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 12 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
61
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more broadly of the extremely unlikely accident. Indeed, one of
the rhetorical skills deployed in the opinions is that of avoiding
practical considerations while sounding practical . . . . To see how
ordinary a case Palsgraf would have been in the hands of an ordinary judge, one has only to read the majority and dissenting opinions in the intermediate appellate court. Cardozo could make
66
silk purses out of sow’s ears—a gift vouchsafed to few judges.

Judge Posner understands that Justice Cardozo was able to hasten
changes in the common law by cloaking his opinions in rhetorical
appeals to unarticulated, undertheorized values. Justice Cardozo became the “academics’ darling,” perhaps because of his impact on the
development of law, but certainly because his rhetorical skills made
his opinions interesting to read and gave academics something to
analyze and to teach, regardless of their evaluation of substantive me67
rits. This is a subtle but important point.
Judge Posner is not really disturbed by the outcome of Justice
Cardozo’s decisions. He admires Justice Cardozo’s conscious pragmatism, and he has no use for the inherited formalism of some of
Justice Cardozo’s contemporaries—a formalism that Justice Cardozo
helped relegate to the judicial back burner at least for a time. Judge
Posner may be bothered that a great judicial writer could achieve
such results—and such a reputation—by skillfully presenting the
wrong or inadequate reasons for decent decisions and by skillfully
appealing to the moralizing instincts in his readers to support outcomes he thought desirable. I think the point may be to stake out a
position for writing opinions in such a manner as to ensure their
popularity with academic lawyers while maintaining a claim to suprarhetorical soundness.
Judge Posner has argued that because values and morals are variable and often highly contested within a given society—and certainly among different societies—they cannot provide an objective
68
basis for concluding that one society is more “moral” than another.
Only science (in the sense of empirical investigation of phenomena)
is able to produce considerable consensus—agreement that a hypothesis is borne out by repeated observations of measurable phenomena. To that extent, Judge Posner suggests that science has
69
made more progress than morals. Further, he argues that there is
no objective basis by which one can assess moral arguments: “At its
66
67
68
69

POSNER, supra note 13, at 46–47.
Id. at 91.
POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 32, at 6.
Id. at 18; see Rorty, supra note 32, at 920–21.
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best, moral philosophy, like literature, enriches; it neither proves nor
70
Judge Posner claims that “[m]oral entrepreneurs peredifies.”
suade, but not with rational arguments.” They use “techniques of
71
nonrational persuasion.” And, of course, he has spent much of his
professional life arguing that economic analyses of the effects of legal
decisions on costs and benefits, among other factors, are more objective. As Richard Rorty commented,
Posner’s refusal to admit that we have made moral progress is a
rhetorical gesture that can have no bearing on practice. For moral progress is not an idea we can possibly get out of our heads.
Only the lingering influence of science-worship tempts us to try.
The positivists agreed with Plato that to have knowledge was to see
things under the aspect of eternity, and they then argued that only natural science could do that. But if we can bring ourselves to
give up that Platonic view of knowledge, we might become willing
to admit that doubts about moral progress are as phony as doubts
about the reality of electrons. Once Plato’s attempt to escape
from time to eternity is abandoned, we are left with nothing but
the hope that we will look good to our future selves, and to future
72
generations. Dewey thought that hope was enough.

Judge Posner devotes the rest of the monograph to discussing the
bases of Justice Cardozo’s “eminence.” Those are first, the rhetoric of
73
his opinions, and second, his pragmatist agenda.
“An important
part of Cardozo’s rhetorical skill was his ability to sugarcoat the
pragmatist pill . . . so that not only his judicial colleagues but the entire legal establishment accepted him as a consummate insider rather
74
than fearing him as a bomb-throwing radical.” Judge Posner does
not attribute Justice Cardozo’s reputation to analytic brilliance or to a
75
substantial impact on the law. Justice Cardozo’s accomplishment on
the New York Court of Appeals “was not to persuade his colleagues to
change their principles (a task beyond the persuasive power of any
judge), but to persuade them to give rein to those principles. He
showed them how to write professionally respectable opinions chang76
ing the law in the direction they and he desired.”
In describing the reputable characteristics of Justice Cardozo’s
judicial opinions, Judge Posner could be describing some of his own:
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 32, at 32.
Id. at ix, 42.
Rorty, supra note 32, at 927.
POSNER, supra note 13, at 126–27, 132.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 131.
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[W]hat we can expect, and what we find in abundance in Cardozo’s opinions, are (1) a vivid, even dramatic, bodying forth of
the judge’s concerns, (2) a lucid presentation of arresting particulars—fodder for academic analysis, (3) a sense of the relatedness
of these particulars to larger themes, (4) a point of view that transcends the litigants’ parochial concerns (for Cardozo it was his
pragmatist program), (5) a power of clear and forceful statement,
and (6) a high degree of sensitivity to the expectations of one’s
audience. Anyone conversant with literature will recognize these
as virtues commonly associated with works of imaginative litera77
ture and therefore rhetorical.
Pursuing the literary analogy we may say that a prime virtue of
a judicial opinion is wit in the eighteenth-century sense of what
oft was thought but ne’er so well expressed. None of the themes
in Cardozo’s judicial oeuvre is novel, and they are played in cases
randomly served from the docket. The skill lies in making each of
them a memorable exemplar of an issue, problem, or approach.
It is an essentially literary skill, which Cardozo possessed to a high
degree. He was also a highly competent legal analyst but no more
so than many judges who are deservedly much less eminent than
he. I suspect that the disquiet that many academic lawyers feel
about Cardozo comes from a reluctance to acknowledge that so
“unprofessional” a skill as literary writing ability could make a
judge great. The academic—the lawyer generally—may admit
that law may sometimes be poetry but is unlikely to admit that po78
The tendency of academics is to
etry may sometimes be law.
view judges (implicitly) as failed academics, to be flayed for the
amusement of students. Natural as it is, this tendency misconceives the proper division of labor between the judge and the professor. The judge is not to compete with the professor but to engage freshly, fruitfully, vivaciously, constructively, and
79
expeditiously with the disputes that he is called on to resolve.

Nearly a century later, some of the same rhetorical moves continue to bemuse academics. Law professors wallow in an opinion that
presents an arresting, if slanted, narration of facts, or whose mellifluous prose glides over a questionable reading of precedent or reveals a
77

Id. at 133–34. I removed an initial sentence that Judge Posner might not apply
to his own opinions, although perhaps this is a subtle apologia to his many critics.
“[W]e should not expect a high order either of intellectual creativity or of analytical
rigor in even the best judicial opinions.” Id. at 133.
78
This remark recalls some of James Boyd White’s work. See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE,
HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985) (suggesting
that Judge Posner shares more of White’s views about the efficacy of constitutive discourse than his funny, but snotty, jabs about White’s use of italics would suggest). See
POSNER, supra note 1, at 289–90.
79
POSNER, supra note 13, at 133–34.
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grand legal principle emerging from an apparently unremarkable
lawsuit. This is possible in part because too many legal academics
remain, for the most part, blithely indifferent to rhetorical analysis in
favor of legal or substantive analysis so that each generation of professors is surprised anew at and grateful for opportunities to demonstrate that they saw through the art to the substantive errors beneath.
Plainly, Judge Posner understands this about his audience. He also
supplies wit in the eighteenth century sense. In many opinions, he
writes with joy, curiosity, inventiveness, fascination with law, and love
for the English language—as he seemingly effortlessly reconstitutes
80
hoary old cases as exemplars of efficiency principles. Like Justice
Cardozo, he can make reading case law fun.
While it is conventional to think of Judge Posner primarily as a
scholar of economic analysis in law, principally motivated by the intellectual insights brought to law from economics, I argue that his devo81
tion to economic analysis may be an effort at self-discipline. His particular genius is that he indulges one love—rhetoric—and then
subjects it to tough love—economics. He wields his rhetorical pen
expertly, promoting his agenda, but it is an agenda that can, he
claims, be measured and assessed by external, non-emotive, nonsubjective criteria. Perhaps he is an “academic darling” because his
opinions address (subtextually) an abiding modern anxiety about the
intersection of power, subjectivity, and authority.
IV. READERS RESPOND: CASEBOOK EDITORS AND LAW PROFESSORS
So far, I have been talking about what may motivate Judge Posner. Now I turn to the qualities that attract casebook editors and law
professors to his opinions. The two most important are rhetorical
strategies he shares with Justice Cardozo. First, he often invokes old
82
“chestnut” cases. A citation check of the chestnut case will quickly
80

See, e.g., Alaska Packers’ Assoc. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), discussed
in Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983).
81
One writer perceives in Judge Posner an “antipathy toward the humanities”
and notes his disapproval of literary critics he regards having “left-wing” agendas.
Guyora Binder, Comment, The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary Criticisms of Law
Offers Posner, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1510, 1516–17 (2001). I do not think Judge Posner has any antipathy to the humanities, at least not literature or rhetoric. He seems
to be fascinated by both. He objects to critics who try to evaluate law using the techniques of humanities disciplines.
82
See Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1388–90 (describing why casebook editors
are likely to include old “chestnuts” updated with more recent opinions that invoke
basic principles suitable for law students); Thomas J. Miles, Posner on Economic Loss in
Tort: EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1813, 1815–16 (1974) (noting Judge Posner’s discussion of twin “chestnuts”: Vosburg v. Putney from torts case-
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reveal the new Judge Posner opinion; its reliance on the old case will
signal to editors and professors an opinion that may be useful for
modernizing without really changing inherited teaching materials.
Invocation of old cases also allows Judge Posner, like Justice Cardozo,
to expound on basic and general legal principles without getting
83
bogged down in the ins-and-outs of more recent precedents. (Perhaps someone will analyze the semiotics of citation practice in creating casebooks!)
Going back to basics increases the odds that the opinion will be
anthologized in casebooks and thus remembered by subsequent gen84
Judge Posner’s tendency to skip over preceerations of lawyers.
dents has provoked criticism from some practitioners, judges, and
scholars who see Judge Posner’s disregard of precedent as unpredict85
able or activist. This Essay does not engage that debate. It may be
that, as a superb student and a long-term law professor, the old
chestnuts come more readily to mind than they do for other judges
who rely more upon the briefs or their clerks’ research. The point is
books, and Hadley v. Baxendale from contracts casebooks); see also M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1739, 1739–59 (2007), and J.
Mark Ramseyer, Not-So-Ordinary Judges in Ordinary Courts: Teaching Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1199–1209 (2007) (both commenting on a rare
Judge Posner dissent that invoked prototypical employment-at-will doctrine to challenge the applicability of established state precedent on the duty to disclose information to employee / shareholders in small corporations, which has now become a classic case in casebooks on corporate law); Sykes, supra note 16, at 1914–15 (noting
Judge Posner’s reliance on Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822), and
apparent, though not logically determinative, reliance on the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965)).
83
See, e.g., Michael Johnson, Comment, Posner on the Uses and Disadvantages of Precedents for Law, 22 REV. LITIG. 143 (2003); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573
(2000).
84
POSNER, supra note 13, at 61–62, 67–69. Judge Posner notes that too much
“law” is one of the problems facing legal educators, observing that the “rapid increase in the number of judges and opinions is making it costly for lawyers, professors, and judges to determine judicial quality, and this may make them rely ever
more heavily on the ‘signal’ of good quality emitted by the powerful reputation of a
Cardozo.” Id. at 69. Note Judge Posner’s use of the rhetorical device, metonymy, in
the phrase “a Cardozo.” Id. The judge with a high reputation—a Cardozo, a Posner—is like a trademark, efficiently signaling a reliable source.
85
See, e.g., Teresa Huang, Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right Step in Determining Joint
Authorship for Copyrighted Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 673, 693–703 (2005); Gerald
P. Moran, A Radical Theory of Jurisprudence: The “Decisionmaker” as the South of Law—The
Ohio Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a Model, 30 AKRON L.
REV. 393, 403 n.32 (1997); Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 212–13 (1998);
Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 109
n.126 (2000).
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simply that this characteristic makes Judge Posner’s opinions attractive to casebook editors who may feel the need to nod at a century or
two of case law in just a few pages. Moreover, if Judge Posner has ignored or misstated more recent precedent, so much the merrier! A
professor can demonstrate acumen by pointing out the misstep to
students and maybe publish an article to boot. Of course some students may hear a mixed message: the opinion is simultaneously anthologized and criticized. But this is legal education’s old mixed
message, which neither Judge Posner nor contemporary casebook
editors invented.
Judge Posner’s use of a 1902 case, Alaska Packers’ Association v.
86
87
Domenic in his 1983 decision in Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co.
provides a striking example of revisionism. The Ninth Circuit decided Alaska Packers’ on the ground that a contract was unenforceable
88
for failure of consideration. Judge Posner recast it as a precedent
89
on economic duress. Selmer sought damages for breach of a construction contract despite having accepted an apparent settlement of
the disputed amounts. Selmer argued that the settlement was unenforceable because Blakeslee had procured it through economic duress. In Alaska Packers’, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a modification to a labor contract for failure of consideration due to the pre90
existing duty rule. Judge Posner’s re-casting of the old case has elicited scholarly interest. In unearthing the facts and the context of the
earlier dispute, Deborah Threedy notes that
Judge Posner has had a great deal to do with the case being considered a [classic] duress case. In the last twenty-five years, Alaska
Packers’ has been cited thirteen times. Twelve of those citations
appeared in cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, and eight of
91
those Seventh Circuit decisions were authored by Judge Posner.

In a similar vein, Douglas Baird argues that Judge Posner has successfully changed and rationalized the doctrine of economic duress by his
92
recasting of Alaska Packers’.
86

117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983).
88
Alaska Packers’, 117 F. at 105.
89
Selmer, 704 F.2d at 926–27.
90
Alaska Packers’, 117 F. at 103.
91
Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, in
CONTRACTS STORIES 335, 342 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007) [hereinafter CONTRACTS
STORIES].
92
Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1641–53
(2007) (arguing that Judge Posner has successfully explained that a defense to enforcement of a contract modification based on economic duress should be confined
87
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For my purposes, the salient point is that Alaska Packers’ appeared in the first edition of what is now the well-known contracts ca93
sebook edited by Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson. The first edition
was published in 1959, the same year that Judge Posner went to Har94
vard Law School. As a first year law student, he may have read it. As
a judge, he has altered our reading of it. Whatever one thinks about
the merits of Judge Posner’s revisionism, his reading of Alaska Packers’
95
is now widely noted in the leading casebooks and Selmer itself has
96
become a principal case in at least one casebook.
The second rhetorical strategy Judge Posner shares with Justice
Cardozo is a discursive or exploratory organization for presenting the
97
legal analysis. This is a pronounced and consistent feature of Judge
Posner’s opinions. Judge Posner rarely states a conclusion at or near
the start of an opinion, and he typically proceeds through a number
to those very rare—perhaps now non-existent situations—where a legal remedy
(however modest) for breach is unobtainable).
93
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTS REMEDIES 762–68(John
Philip Dawson ed., 1959). Alaska Packers’ has persisted as a principal case through
the eighth edition. CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 569 (John Philip Dawson et al.
eds., 8th ed. 2003). Selmer appears in a note. Id. at 572.
94
Dawson taught at Harvard. In 1959, there were two contracts casebooks in use
at Harvard—Dawson’s and Lon Fuller’s. Fuller’s did not contain Alaska Packers’. Email from Lesley Schoenfeld, Access Services Coordinator, Harvard Law School Special Collections Department, to Kelly Aldrich, Reference Librarian, Reference Office,
Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington School of Law (Apr. 2, 2008,
10:35:47 EST) (on file with author). I have not discovered which professor taught
Judge Posner, but the Dawson casebook is a bestseller, now in its ninth edition. If
Judge Posner did not read it as a first-year student, he no doubt became aware of it as
a law professor.
95
See, e.g., CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 636, 649 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 3d
ed. 2008) (citing Threedy, supra note 91, at 639–43, and reprinting a different Judge
Posner opinion, United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., 905 F.2d 1117 (7th
Cir. 1990) which cites Alaska Packers’ at 649); CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 382 (Robert
E. Scott et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (citing Judge Posner’s discussion of Alaska Packers’
in Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411
(1977)); PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 715 (Charles L. Knapp et
al. eds., 6th ed. 2007).
96
See, e.g., 1 CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 568 (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 2d ed.
2003).
97
I use “discursive” here in the sense of “[c]overing a wide field of subjects; rambling” and not in the alternative sense of “[p]roceeding to a conclusion through reason rather than intuition.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, supra note 44, at 532. Judge Posner has used the term “exploratory” in a
similar vein to distinguish what he calls the “high” or “pure” style of opinion in which
a judge declares the law and the judgment as if each were inevitable from the low or
impure style in which the judge explains his options and his reasoning more informally. Judge Posner favors the latter approach. Posner, supra note 22, at 1426–32;
see also Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 201 (1990).
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of issues and analyses before revealing to the reader the analysis he
98
As far as I have discovered, he states his
believes determinative.
99
conclusion early only when dissenting. That makes sense, because
the reader already knows that the dissenter disagrees with the majority. Deferring the conclusion and thereby exploring a variety of possible analyses is substantively suited to his pragmatic jurisprudence.
Because he believes the legal rules in contested cases are often unclear and judges will have difficulty not applying their own values in
such cases, he is annoyed by opinions that rely on rhetorical constructs, like syllogistic organization, that camouflage those defects.
He associates the “high,” authoritative, declarative, and deductive
style with a genuine, if misguided, certainty about the law or an effort
100
to camouflage judicial discretion.
There is a tremendous amount of sheer hypocrisy in judicial opinion-writing. . . . Judges have a terrible anxiety about being
thought to base their opinions on guesses, on their personal
views. To allay that anxiety, they rely on the apparatus of precedent and history, much of it extremely phony. I do think judges
can and should get away with a lot more candor, so that the public sees what a court is—not geniuses, or even particularly erudite
people, but just lawyers trying to give some reasonable ground for
101
their opinions.

Discursive organization offers editors and professors an additional incentive to select or teach his opinions. William Domnarski
has suggested that Judge Posner’s judicial “essays” fill in where class102
room Socratic dialogue has dwindled. I suspect this is right. Judge
Posner’s opinions efficiently demonstrate what students are supposed
to learn to do. Read an anthologized Judge Posner opinion—or indeed almost any Judge Posner opinion—and you are likely to see the
structure of an unusually smooth Socratic dialogue where hypotheti98

See infra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 444 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting). In distinction to his majority opinions’ typical organization,
Judge Posner states his conclusion in the first paragraph: “I disagree with this holding. The terms of the stockholder agreement show that there was no duty of disclosure, and since there was no duty there was no violation of Rule 10b-5.” Id. See also
Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J., dissenting) (concluding, within the first full page, that “[w]ithout more detail concerning Gattem’s
crime, I am unconvinced that the Board made a rational judgment in classifying it as
an ‘aggravated felony’”).
100
Posner, supra note 22, at 1432–33. But see Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note
25, and Wald, Reply to Judge Posner, supra note 25.
101
Linda Greenhouse, Interview; In His Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at 14
(quoting Judge Richard A. Posner).
102
WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 143 (1996).
99
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cal solutions are raised, examined, and then discarded seriatim until
103
one arrives finally at a satisfactory solution. Judge Posner even pos104
es factual hypotheticals, just as a classroom professor might.
This discursive approach has other advantages for pageconstrained editors and time-constrained professors. In the course of
raising and discarding alternative possible analyses of the issues in a
case, Judge Posner also provides capsule summaries of doctrine and
juxtaposes doctrinal “cousins,” effectively demonstrating just the skill
that most traditional law professors want their students to demonstrate on exams—the ability to analyze a given set of facts through
multiple doctrinal lenses. It has also struck me that Judge Posner’s
opinions sometimes read like truly exceptional exam answers for “issue-spotter” hypotheticals.
Judge Posner’s discursive organization also adds some suspense,
making his opinions more interesting to read than the run of the mill
opinions. A Judge Posner opinion has a beginning, middle, and end
that build and then resolve a certain legal tension—an opinion that
begins with issue and conclusion cannot create much suspense.
Sometimes, where the facts are key to the legal issue, Judge Posner

103

See Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988) (examining a series of possible interpretations of the duty of “good faith” in a requirements contract); Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir.
1985) (explaining the difference between a liquidated damages clause and a penalty
clause with reflections on freedom of contract and efficient breach); Morin Bldg.
Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining whether
a jury instruction was correct by examining different state law rules governing whether exercise of a satisfaction clause is subject to a reasonableness standard); Selmer
Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining the reasons
for making some, but not all, forms of coercion or pressure illegal for purposes of
contract formation). See also In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2003) (sequencing
arguments for classifying a bankrupt’s property as tangible or intangible under an
exemption statute); Harmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 9 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir.
1993) (presenting various arguments for and against equitable reformation of an insurance contract where the insured was murdered by the putative beneficiary); Brazell v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust of Rockford, 982 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1992) (considering various factual arguments supporting a claim for fraud on a loan guarantor);
Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986) (considering various factual claims to
ownership of a painting in light of laws on bailment, abandonment and conversion).
104
See Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2007) (hypothesizing, “[s]uppose Guidant had stolen half the money in a plan participant’s retirement
account and a suit by the participant resulted in a judgment for that amount”); Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 2006) (hypothesizing, “[s]uppose that
it turns out that some part of the grant to Notre Dame was used to defray the cost of
religious activities at the other schools. Several possibilities would then heave into
view”).
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105

lets them drive the plot, but more typically his fact descriptions are
remarkable more for clarity and brevity than rhetorical flair. In this,
his facts differ markedly from Justice Cardozo’s in the famous open106
Raw manipulation of facts to pull on the heartstrings
ing to Hynes.
might appeal to non-rational instincts. Instead, Judge Posner creates
suspense by tempting readers down superficially plausible analytic
pathways and then, just when he has them going, reveals an obstacle
they had not anticipated. He may repeat the trick several times until
107
His
at last he reveals the direct line to the most sensible outcome.
authorial persona replicates the Socratic professor’s in seeming to
explore new ground. Reading an opinion like this is more fun—at
least for academics and students, if not practicing attorneys—than
reading the more standard, syllogistic resolution of yet another tawdry or tragic legal dispute—no matter what one ultimately thinks of
the merits.
It is not that Judge Posner has more interesting cases than other
judges do. He imbues his cases, for the student if not for the practitioner, with interest and excitement, maybe even passion.. The student’s attention is redirected to the evolving drama of Judge Posner’s
revelation of “the path of the law” and often away from the dispute
and the parties. Just as a great critic can make a review more interesting than the book, so Judge Posner can make the law more interesting than the conflict that occasions it.
108
109
Both Selmer and Lake River provide clear examples of this dis110
111
In re Oakley provides an excursive approach in contract cases.
105

See Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the possible skullduggery about a painting.); Cecaj v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the abuse of an asylum-seeker).
106
Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 131 N.E. 898, 898–900 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo begins by stating, “On July 8, 1916, Harvey Hynes, a lad of sixteen, swam with two companions from the Manhattan to the Bronx side of the Harlem River or United States
Ship canal, a navigable stream.”).
107
See infra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
108
Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983). After stating the issue as whether Wisconsin contract law would recognize the defense of economic duress and reciting the facts, Judge Posner begins the analysis with a fine example of the “impure” or “low” style. See supra note 97.
If you extract a promise by means of a threat, the promise is unenforceable. That is not, as is so often stated, because such a promise is
involuntary unless “involuntary” is a conclusion rather than the description of a mental state. If the threat is ferocious (“your money or
your life”) and believed, the victim may be desperately eager to fend it
off with a promise. Such promises are made unenforceable in order to
discourage threats by making them less profitable. The fundamental
issue in a duress case is therefore not the victim’s state of mind but
whether the statement that induced the promise is the kind of offer to
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deal that we want to discourage, and hence that we call a “threat.”
Selmer argues that Blakeslee-Midwest said to it in effect, “give up
$53,000 of your claim for extras [$120,000 minus $67,000] or you will
get nothing.” This has the verbal form of a threat but is easily recast as
a promise innocuous on its face—“I promise to pay you $67,000 for a
release of your claim.” There is a practical argument against treating
such a statement as a threat: it will make an inference of duress inescapable in any negotiation where one party makes an offer from which
it refuses to budge, for the other party will always be able to argue that
he settled only because there was a (figurative) gun at his head.
Selmer, 704 F.2d at 926–27 (citations omitted). Possibly contrary Wisconsin cases are
not discussed, although their existence is indicated by “cf.” citations. Id. at 927.
Great attention is paid, however, to Alaska Packers’. Id. Then, in a transition that
would surely puzzle the average first-year student, the opinion turns into a less-thantransparent lesson on the availability of a judicial remedy (perhaps inadequate) as
the determinant of whether contract modifications or settlements that result from
economic bullying during performance will be enforced. Id. The topic of good faith
in performance never comes up. Good stuff to discuss with first-year law students,
no?
109
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289–90 (7th Cir. 1985)
(explaining how to differentiate a penalty clause from a liquidated damages clause,
while minimizing the significance of the contract language and ignoring all but direct performance costs). For a good discussion of the case and why it has become a
casebook standard, see Cunningham, supra note 5, at 1448–55.
110
A random selection of less well-known Judge Posner opinions reveals minilectures on legal analysis. See, e.g., Farmers Auto Ins. Ass’n. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 482 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2007) (regarding insurance contract interpretation);
Westowne Shoes v. Brown Group, 104 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1997) (regarding a franchise dispute); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 182 (7th
Cir. 1997) (discussing a contract breach, and comparing mitigation of damages with
comparative fault defenses in tort). I happened upon one recent Judge Posner opinion that was not well-written. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 485 F.3d 930 (7th
Cir. 2007) (involving a breach of a confidentiality clause and theft of trade secrets).
This case struck me as atypical in that the prose was convoluted and the facts were
hard to follow. See id. at 931–32. Judge Posner used unusually complex sentence
structures. The seriatim discussion of legal issues is needlessly opaque. It is never
quite clear whether the determinative issue is the enforceability of an employee assignment, non-compete and confidentiality agreement, or the trade secret status of
the arguably assigned information.
111
In re Oakley involves a bankruptcy exemption statute and provides a minilecture on the economic difference between tangible and intangible property. In re
Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 711–13 (7th Cir. 2003). Judge Posner uses a particularly detached style to explain why the debtor cannot exempt $2700 cash from the reach of
the bankruptcy trustee because it exceeds the $100 maximum for “intangible” property. Id. at 714. The opinion offers a classic instrumentalist analysis that focuses on
why the statute might distinguish between tangible and intangible property. Id. at
713.
The opinion provides a history lesson in the common law distinctions between
tangible and intangible property. Id. at 713–14. But, I found the outcome and rhetoric distressing. The debtor—about whose earning capacity Judge Posner provided
no information—was left by the decision with exempt “intangible” property of $100
in cash and $900 in “tangible” clothing and goods, for a total of $1000. Id. at 714.
The Indiana statute permitted an exemption of $100 of intangible assets and $4000
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ample in a bankruptcy case; and Unites States Department of Education v.
112
National Collegiate Athletic Association, is an example in an evidence
case.
The Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd. provides a partial counterpoint to Judge Posner’s usual
113
discursive organization. While Judge Posner does not state the bottom line at the very beginning of the opinion, he rather uncharacteristically states his conclusion as to each substantive issue as soon as he
114
raises it. Judge Cudahy’s dissent may have inspired Judge Posner to
write more definitively in order to counter Judge Cudahy’s critique
that the Judge Posner’s analysis of both the facts and the law were
“implausible,” “so lopsided as to be almost droll—if it were not seri115
Judge Posner’s dissent in
ous business,” and “equally one-sided.”
116
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc. is also closer to the pure style and much
less discursive—at least until the end when Judge Posner provides a
117
laundry list of factors that ought to be considered in such cases. As
noted above, this makes sense, given that he is arguing against the
majority decision and is only concerned with correcting its errors.

of tangible assets. Id. at 710. The debtor had attempted to exempt $2700 in cash.
Id. at 711. The opinion does not explain why so much of his assets was in cash—
whether he had just sold a car, for example, when foreclosure struck, or whether
there was a nefarious reason. Judge Posner does not address the fact that the debtor
ended up with only about one quarter of what Indiana would have exempted had the
cash been deemed tangible. Judge Posner explains that the intent of the statute is to
prevent debtors from shielding liquid assets because those are the kind that creditors
can use most efficiently, and he used a classic cost / benefit rationale to show that any
other interpretation would make credit more expensive for all. Id. at 712–13. He
does not mention the possibility that the Indiana statute might have been designed
to ensure that bankrupts were left with $4100 of assets.
The style alternates between historical erudition and near-comedy. The opinion
provides a clever illustration of the difference between intangible and tangible property: “A napkin has value; you can wipe your mouth with it. Wallpaper has value; you
can decorate your walls with it. People do not wipe their mouths with money or paper their walls with it.” Id. at 713. I thought that these references bordered on bathroom humor—hinting at what you can use to wipe what. I also thought that the reference to wallpaper was insultingly frivolous in this bankruptcy context.
112
United States Dep’t. of Educ. v. Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 481 F.3d 936,
938–42 (7th Cir. 2007) (raising and dismissing a sequence of reasons why the NCAA
might claim a privilege).
113
Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd.,
970 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
114
Id. at 276.
115
Id. at 283 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
116
815 F.2d 429, 444–52 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting).
117
Id. at 451–52 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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V. WHAT MIGHT A PROFESSOR DO DIFFERENTLY?
I believe that an explicit focus on rhetorical strategies can reveal
important messages that conventional readings and substantive critiques may miss. This Part presents a few ideas about what professors
might share with students. I will use two very different opinions to illustrate my points.
Let us suppose that a professor wanted to encourage students to
think deliberately about why one of the apparent aims and certainly
one of the common effects of traditional legal education is to disabuse new students of certain assumptions that may have served them
reasonably well in lay life. For example, law schools are famous for
shocking new law students into recognizing that their intuitions
about what is right or wrong may not be apt or sufficiently nuanced
to serve in legal practice. Or, to take another more complicated example, legal education may undermine some students’ assumptions
that law and morality are entwined, that legal behavior should also be
moral (by some criterion), and that moral behavior should be legal.
If a professor wanted students to reflect on how the process of legal
education may effect these transformations without providing any
theoretical materials relevant to the underlying jurisprudential issues,
that professor might focus on Judge Posner because of his frank dis118
regard for moralism.
Another strategy would be to share with students some of what
Judge Posner has written extra-judicially about the issue and put his
life and times in some sort of intellectual and political context. This
seems to me an approach more interesting, rigorous, and honest
than simply assigning his opinions among a stream of opinions that
seem to be about doctrine.
One could also focus on how Judge Posner’s rhetorical strategies
reflect his views on the intersection of law and conventional ideas of
“good” behavior and what his status in the legal academy and profession suggests about acceptance of his attitudes. At least three discussions might emerge. The first considers how Judge Posner handles
the doctrine of good faith in contract performance, a vexatious doctrinal nomenclature for a judge hostile to moralistic arguments. The
second considers the role of empathy for a party, or the rhetorical
semblance of empathy, in a judicial opinion. The third considers the
construction of an authoritative voice in the legal profession.
118

Such an exercise would focus on the formation of “professional identity,” a
type of lesson the Carnegie Report advocates. THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at
126–61.
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A. Using Discursive Organization to Change Readers’ Understanding
A close reading of Judge Posner’s discursive organization of
119
Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey illustrates a subtext of
what “good faith” does and does not mean for Judge Posner. Market
120
Street is reproduced in at least one contracts casebook and has at121
In Judge Posner’s hands, the case intracted scholarly comment.
volves the duty of good faith in performance of contracts. I use this
mundane case to illustrate Judge Posner’s extraordinary ability to attract attention to an opinion that surely never would have emerged
from the reports into casebooks and scholarship without his assiduity.
Few other judges or academics would have perceived the opportunity
to craft a novel lesson on the duty of good faith in contract performance in this appeal.
Market Street, a lessee of shopping mall property, sued the Gen122
Market Street
eral Electric Pension Trust, lessor of the property.
sought specific performance of the Trust’s alleged contractual duty to
convey title of the property at the Trust’s cost upon failure of the par123
ties to negotiate a loan to finance improvements. There were three
issues on appeal. The first concerned diversity of citizenship for fed124
The second concerned whether Market Street
eral jurisdiction.
119

941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
1 CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION, supra note 96, at 598.
121
See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (2007); see also, Cunningham,
supra note 5, at 1409 (making an extended analysis of Justice Cardozo’s and Judge
Posner’s opinions and arguing, in part, that Judge Posner turns Justice Cardozo’s
understanding of good faith in contract performance “upside down”).
122
Market Street Assoc. Ltd., 941 F.2d at 589.
123
Id.
124
Although the first two issues are edited out of the Macaulay casebook, Judge
Posner’s analysis might be useful to civil procedure or professional responsibility professors—at least if they might want to produce an in terrorem effect. Toward inept
counsel, Judge Posner does not emulate Justice Cardozo’s alleged “saintliness.” Market Street Associates, a limited partnership, had sued the General Electric Pension
Trust in Wisconsin state court, and the Trust had removed the suit to federal court
where the district court accepted jurisdiction. Id. at 589. Judge Posner delivers a lecture to the lower court, the Trust’s counsel, and law students—who might be reading
the unexpurgated version—on the need to establish complete diversity of citizenship
among all the parties, including the limited partners. Id. at 589–90. While it is quite
proper that the Seventh Circuit should insist on proof of jurisdiction, the fact that
counsel did manage, however belatedly, to demonstrate complete diversity makes it
interesting that Judge Posner sets out the rules in a case in where neither the rule
nor the rule’s application was contested. Id. One would have thought that the lecture would have been more apt in a case where jurisdiction was not obtained or was
questionable. Be that as it may, this short lecture illustrates one of Judge Posner’s
authorial characteristics that must make him attractive to law professors. The lecture
should also send a chill down the spine of the law student aspiring to litigate.
120

O'NEILL (FINAL)

540

4/6/2009 11:17:41 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:507

had waived its right to trial by bringing a motion for summary judg125
The third concerned the meaning of “good faith” in conment.
126
tract performance, and this issue predominates.
Judge Posner uses the opinion’s opening paragraph to suggest,
rather than define, this third issue. He also uses the opening paragraph to inspire the reader to keep reading. The paragraph opens,
“Market Street Associates . . . appeal[s] from a judgment for the defendants . . . entered upon cross-motions for summary judgment in a
diversity suit that pivots on the doctrine of ‘good faith’ performance
127
of a contract.”
It closes with “[b]ut before we can get to the substance of the dispute we need to consider a jurisdictional and a pro128
cedural question.” The first sentence creates some modest interest
and perhaps a touch of suspense, at least for the weary academic
reader, precisely because the issue is not technically defined. Note
129
And true to form, Judge Posner
the vivid but vague verb “pivot.”
withholds the court’s answer. The last sentence preserves the narrative momentum, propelling the reader through the first two technical
issues with the assurance that after considering them, “we can get to
130
the substance of the dispute.” Eight paragraphs later, after defense
counsel has been thoroughly admonished for sloppiness, “[w]e come
131
at last to the contract dispute out of which the case arises.”
So far, so good, one might think. Judge Posner has managed to
create some interest about a dull squabble between a developer and
an institutional investor over a small parcel in a shopping mall. Observe that the facts—discouragingly tedious, involving interpretation
of Paragraph 34 of a lease—are not mentioned in the opening paragraph. Instead, Judge Posner manages to create a little suspense out
of next to nothing by withholding information about the case, much
less its resolution.
132
Note the use of “we” in the first and the eighth paragraphs.
Although the first person plural is commonly used in majority appellate opinions, Judge Posner’s usage subtly shifts from a reference to
his judicial colleagues on the panel to his common enterprise with
the reader. After all, by the time an opinion appears in the reports,
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 590.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Market Street, 941 F.2d at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 589, 591.
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the judges on the panel have already taken and completed the analytic journey. So, a sentence like this one, ”But before we can get to
the substance of the dispute we need to consider a jurisdictional and
133
a procedural question,” is pure artifice. The putative judicial “we”
has already considered and decided these issues. Instead, this familiar “we” has subtly shifted its meaning to “you, dear reader, and I.”
Readers must also be subtly flattered, or at least relieved, by inclusion
134
in this “we.” By the time, in paragraph eight, “we come at last” to
the merits, “we” must breathe a sigh of relief that “we”—unlike hapless defense counsel—have not wasted the court’s time by failing to
135
understand and comply with “settled law.”
“We,” the readers, have been invited up onto the bench where
we can join with Judge Posner in sorting out the only interesting issue. “We” are safely distant from counsel or party. Judge Posner did
not invent emotional distance or the literary features that create or
support it, of course. Emotional distance typifies an appeal, which is
conducted mostly, if not exclusively, by written arguments about legal
authority, and it is normalized in the practice of teaching law through
136
appellate opinions. But Judge Posner steps back even further than
legal procedures require. He is adept, and probably self-conscious, in
using rhetoric to distance the reader from a party and even its lawyer
if the reader’s emotional detachment will support his analysis. Promoting detachment is consonant with his distaste for moralizing in
legal analysis. In this case, the rhetorical technique detaches the
reader from the facts of the dispute and, in a nice twist, arguably attaches the reader emotionally and intellectually to the judge and to
his view of the case. Most readers, perhaps especially law students,
will indulge in schadenfreude—delighting in the misery of others—as
Judge Posner skewers the lawyers for their mistakes.
There is still more to say about this superficially mundane first
paragraph. Just after the first sentence appears a “cf.” citation to a
137
1968 article by Robert Summers on “good faith” in common law
and the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
133

Id. at 589.
Market Street, 941 F.2d. at 591.
135
Id. at 590.
136
See MERTZ, supra note 9, at 67, 82–83, 120–28.
137
Robert Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 232–43 (1968). Of course, Judge Posner might have cited Article 2’s notice provisions as persuasive authorities to support
his decision that Market Street could not sue for specific performance without first
providing the Trust with a clear warning that it planned to exercise its rights to the
property. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-606, 2-608. But he did not.
134
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(U.C.C.). There is no need for a citation there at all. Judge Posner
then explains that Wisconsin common law governs this dispute and
139
Judges typically anthat Articles 2 and 2A of the U.C.C. do not.
nounce the source of governing law, but it is unusual to explain why
some other body of law does not govern where there is no conceivable argument that it might. At first, I thought this was just an example of a writer following his own lead. Having cited an article whose
title referred to common law and to the U.C.C., perhaps Judge Posner thought he needed to announce that the U.C.C. does not apply.
But I now think the citation and subsequent sentence are artful.
The superfluous citation to an old article by Summers, a renowned
scholar, signals erudition in the author and significance for the opinion. The age of the article—written shortly after the states’ widespread adoption of Article 2—and the eminence of the author signal
that the opinion will deal with fundamental issues, not with recent
twists of state precedent. This citation serves the same purpose as citing old chestnut cases. The detailed explanation of which law governs—surely superfluous for the lawyer and unedifying to the lay
reader—seems peculiarly directed to contracts professors for whom
Article 2’s scope might be an early lesson. Even the narrative structure, described above as a tool for generating reader interest, would
suit a contracts casebook editor. The last sentence of the first paragraph and the first sentence of the eighth make it a breeze for the
editor to cut the jurisdictional and procedural issues without drafting
140
the slightest editorial transition.
If we now proceed with Judge Posner to the substantive good
faith performance issue, on which the case “pivots,” his odd usage at
the beginning of the opinion begins to make sense. The vagueness of
“pivots” not only keeps the reader interested but also preserves Judge
141
We will
Posner’s characterization of the issue from misstatement.
learn at the end of the opinion that the precise issue on appeal is not
whether the parties acted in good faith, but whether, in finding that
the plaintiff had not acted in good faith and in granting the Trust’s
summary judgment motion, the trial court applied the appropriate
142
standard.
But first Judge Posner wants to use the opinion to disabuse readers, including perhaps the district court, of any naïve notion that “good faith” in contract law means what it does in the ver138
139
140
141
142

Market Street, 941 F.2d at 589.
Id.
Id. at 589, 591.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 597–98.
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nacular. He defers to the very end the actual holding that the case
143
must be remanded to correct a possible procedural error —the record indicated that the lower court may not have viewed the evidence
in the light most favorable to Market Street as the non-moving
144
party.
In the meantime, however, Judge Posner discusses the merits
and emphasizes the paradox that a decision for the Trust would save
it from the consequences of failing to read and understand its own
145
contract.
Describing a possible judgment as paradoxical creates
dramatic tension because it signals that the judgment will indeed be
for the Trust. If not, there would be no need to mention a paradox.
But Judge Posner does not actually believe there is a paradox. Instead, this is a rhetorical device to frame Posner’s explanation of
good faith.
Recall that the case arose on Market Street’s suit for specific performance and the Trust’s motion for summary judgment on the
ground, among others, that Market Street had not acted in good faith
when it failed to call the Trust’s attention to Paragraph 34 after the
146
The Trust’s agent
Trust failed to respond to its financing request.
had ignored the plaintiff’s request for financing apparently without
recognizing that this refusal might be treated as a breakdown of financing negotiations and, thus, the condition precedent to the defendant’s duty to convey the property back to the plaintiff at a favorable price. Market Street apparently did not give defendant prior
notice that it regarded the Trust’s non-response as a breach of the
duty to negotiate and, as such, the condition precedent to the exer147
cise of its right under Paragraph 34. In other words, Market Street
seems to have engaged in contract “gotcha.”
But Judge Posner is not interested in proceeding directly to an
analysis of whether Market Street was entitled to behave in this way
under the terms of the contract or, perhaps, under standards of reasonable commercial behavior. He prefers to discuss the Trust’s sloppy conduct, and he characterizes the Trust’s problem as a failure to
148
read and understand.
I doubt that most business people would
characterize the Trust’s problem as a failure to read or understand its
contract. Instead, its agent’s rudeness in failing to respond to Market
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 598.
Market Street, 941 F.2d at 597.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 597.
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Street and its negligence in failing to better supervise or train the
agent or to have better risk management procedures in place are
management mistakes. But Judge Posner characterizes the Trust’s
behavior as a failure to read and understand its own contract because
the reference to reading and understanding neatly anticipates his later discussion of the misnamed and technically irrelevant “duty to
149
read” doctrine.
Courts use the “duty to read” doctrine to determine the scope of
a party’s contractual obligation under written terms the party could
150
have read, regardless of whether the party did in fact read them.
The Trust never argued that it had not read or understood Paragraph
34. It argued that it had not been notified that Market Street ex151
pected to exercise a right. The question on appeal was not whether
the Trust was bound by the terms in the lease, which it may not have
read or fully understood before signing—the scenario where the preformation “duty to read” applies. Judge Posner understood all of this
perfectly, we can be sure. Instead, his description of the Trust’s conduct as a failure to read the lease creates a verbal, associative link to
the “duty to read” doctrine that camouflages the leap in legal logic
from all but the most critical readers.
One might wonder why he bothers. I suspect he makes this rather strenuous rhetorical effort to persuade the reader that the precontractual “duty to read” doctrine is pertinent because its presence
gives him an excuse for explaining the economic rationale for disparate treatment of pre- and post-contract behavior and for avoiding a
moralistic evaluation of the parties’ relative good faith.
The pre-contractual duty to read establishes a hard-nosed prin152
Absent fraud or misrepreciple in which good faith is irrelevant.
sentation, pre-contractual parties have no duty to correct one an153
Starting here, Judge Posner, in
other’s oversights or mistakes.
similarly non-moralistic terms, contrasts parties’ duties after a contract is formed. The duty to alert another contracted party to its own
mistake is not because of moralistic sounding duty of good faith, but
149

Id.
See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run
by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1052–55
(1966); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (1997) (holding
purchasers of a computer bound by an arbitration term in a contract enclosed with a
computer despite their claim that they had not read the contract closely enough to
have discovered the arbitration clause).
151
Market Street, 941 F.2d at 597.
152
Id.
153
Id.
150
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because it is efficient to do so. Judge Posner explains his controversial default rule for contract performance:
[T]he overriding purpose of contract law . . . is to give the parties
what they would have stipulated for expressly if at the time of
making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the future and the costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the
contract had been zero.
....
To be able to correct your contract partner’s mistake at zero cost
to yourself, and decide not to do so, is a species of opportunistic
behavior that the parties would have expressly forbidden in the
154
contract had they foreseen it.

We can now understand Judge Posner’s curious usage. The appeal
“pivoted” on the trial court’s evaluation of Market Street’s good faith,
but Judge Posner prefers not to discuss the case on those terms. By
focusing initially on the paradox that the Trust might win despite its
carelessness, he diverts the reader’s attention from Market Street’s
“gotcha” tactics, and he contrives a doctrine that allows him to shift
the analysis from the moralistic vocabulary of good faith to the new,
economic vocabulary of efficiency. The effect of this rather elaborate
framing is to remind and persuade the reader that there is no gener155
alized duty to be one’s “brother’s keeper,” and the duty of good
faith during performance is merely a default rule about efficiency. I
suspect that Judge Posner would say that he, unlike Justice Cardozo,
has given a reason for his judgment.
I hope I have illustrated how much students could learn from attending to why Judge Posner may use a particular rhetorical technique, like discursive organization. An ordinary judge might have resolved the case on narrow grounds without the need for a lesson
about good faith. The judge could rely on the language of the infamous Paragraph 34, which provided that both parties “shall negotiate
156
The plaintiff had neither negotiated nor made any
in good faith.”
serious effort to provoke the Trust into negotiating. The judge could
154

Id. at 596–97. Cf. Morin Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413
(7th Cir. 1983) (relying on a comparable type of default rule—that contract satisfaction clauses are interpreted to mean what a reasonable person would find satisfactory
absent evidence that the parties really bargained for subjective satisfaction). See generally Scott Brewer, Satisfaction and Posner’s Morin Opinion: Aliquando Bonus Dormitat
Posnerus?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1123 (deconstructing the logic of Morin’s reasoning).
155
Genesis 4:9. Here is a real “chestnut” reference—the biblical story of Cain and
Abel. It is interesting that the phrase has come to stand for the opposite, I think, of
the biblical story’s import. Cain was not supposed to kill his brother. His question is
rhetorical and designed to evade responsibility. See id. at 4:1–16.
156
Market Street, 941 F.2d at 592.
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also have held that the plaintiff’s failure to provide notice was itself a
breach of the duty of good faith and sufficient to preclude an equitable remedy.
B. Creating Empathy, or a Semblance of It
I turn now to lessons about how a skilled writer may create empathy in the reader, or its semblance in the authorial persona. The
157
Green Bag reprinted Judge Posner’s opinion in Cecaj v. Gonzales in its
158
Judge Posner’s
annual compilation of exemplary legal writings.
statement of facts seems a model for the creation of empathy. The
case was an appeal from a denial of a petition for asylum. The first issue was whether the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had erred
in holding that there was not substantial evidence that an applicant
159
for asylum in the United States had been persecuted in Albania.
Because the issue involved the weighing of evidence, the opinion presents a relatively rare instance where Judge Posner focuses more on
the facts than on the legal analysis. He narrates the following in vivid
but dispassionate terms:
In 1998, Cecaj—whom the immigration judge found wholly credible—was arrested following a political protest in which he had
participated. He was detained for six days and during that period
was beaten by masked police with rubber truncheons and also
kicked, suffering injuries that required his hospitalization. A few
days after his release from the hospital, a member of the Socialist
Party accosted Cecaj on the street and fired a gun near his head,
an act that Cecaj sensibly interpreted as a threat. He fled to
Greece but returned in 2000 and resumed his political activity
with the New Democratic Party. . . . The following year, after an
unsuccessful run for mayor of his hometown, he stood for the Albanian parliament on the New Democratic Party ticket in his hometown, which was dominated by the Socialist Party. Although he
was a well-known local figure and candidate for public office, he
was arrested during the campaign and beaten by the police, ostensibly for not having identification papers on him. He also received threatening phone calls, which he believed came from the
police. The last straw was the kidnapping of his 10-year-old
brother by unknown persons who told the child that he was being
kidnapped because of Cecaj’s political activity and that the child

157

440 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2006).
THE GREEN BAG ALMANAC OF USEFUL AND ENTERTAINING TIDBITS FOR LAWYERS &
READER OF GOOD LEGAL WRITING FROM THE PAST YEAR, 239–42 (Ross E. Davies ed.,
2006).
159
Cecaj, 440 F.3d at 898–99.
158
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“would end up dead” if Cecaj “didn’t do what they say.” The child
was released unharmed after a few hours but Cecaj received a call
in which “they said that [the kidnapping] was the last warning.”
Cecaj prudently abandoned his candidacy and left Albania with
160
his wife.

The next paragraph reports, in deadpan tone, the BIA’s explanation
of why each one of these incidents, standing alone, failed to constitute evidence of persecution, and the following paragraph provides
Judge Posner’s evaluation.
The immigration judge’s analysis of the evidence was radically deficient. He failed to consider the evidence as a whole, as he was
required to by the elementary principles of administrative law.
Instead he broke it into fragments. Suppose you saw someone
holding a jar and you said, “That’s a nice jar,” and he smashed it
to smithereens and said, “No, it’s not a jar.” That is what the im161
migration judge did.

The opinion thus presents a short, clear, and persuasive statement of
the facts—followed by an unequivocal conclusion and a vivid, if odd,
162
simile.
By sequencing the abuses inflicted on Cecaj, Judge Posner
160

Id. at 898 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
Id. at 899.
162
The conclusion and example are, of course, not part of the statement of facts,
but it is easier to discuss these fairly characteristic rhetorical moves in context at this
time. I find the simile odd because it seems to compare abuse by political actors in a
failed, or nearly failed, state with a “nice jar” and then to compare the administrative
judge’s decision to “smash[ing] it to smithereens.” See id. It is certainly an arresting
image, especially because language like this is so rare in judicial writing. The comparisons are puzzling, to say the least, but the simile is probably effective in producing agreement by most readers, if only because it stops a reader from plowing mindlessly and unfeelingly into the intricacies of appellate review of administrative
decisions. The simile turns the administrative judge into a perverse bully, much like
Cecaj’s Albanian tormentors. For me, the jar also suggests a remote literary reference to a well-known Wallace Stevens poem, Anecdote of the Jar (1919), which Judge
Posner has probably read even if he did not intend an allusion. In an interesting coincidence, Thomas Grey has written on both Stevens and Judge Posner. See THOMAS
C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY 1–2 (1991).
One might accuse Judge Posner of the failing to give any “reasons” for his judgment, just as he accused Justice Cardozo of failing to give “reasons” for the judgment
in Hynes. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 33. Most of the rest of the opinion is devoted
to arguing with the administrative judge’s inferences or failures to draw inferences
from imperfect evidence of the Albanian government’s complicity in Cecaj’s persecution. Cecaj, 440 F.3d at 899–900. Judge Posner’s chief point is a bare assertion that
the “elementary principles of administrative law” require the judge to evaluate the
evidence as a whole. Id. at 899. He does not discuss the cases he cites. See id. This
criticism may be unfair to the extent that Judge Posner does not want to take the
time to reiterate reasons he has articulated elsewhere for not deferring to the administrative law judge. See Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation and Immigration Law, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1671–87 (2007) (noting that Judge Posner, along with many other
161
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paints a horrifying picture of political persecution that seems to speak
for itself and renders absurd the administrative judge’s apparent demand of proof that each incident was government-sponsored or gov163
In reciting Cecaj’s fate twice,
ernment-sanctioned persecution.
once in Judge Posner’s words and then in the administrative judge’s
deconstructed version, Judge Posner emphasizes the double trap in
which Cecaj was caught: abuse in Albania and bureaucratic indiffer164
ence in the United States. Only a hard-hearted reader could fail to
boil up with indignation, but Judge Posner avoids any overtly emotional language. He is the dispassionate judge, tipping his hand only
slightly near the end of the first paragraph where the phrase, “the last
straw” and the word “prudently” subtly signal adoption of Cecaj’s
165
point of view.
This effective organization and tone produces an emotional response in the reader while preserving the persona of a dispassionate
judicial author. Is Judge Posner consciously appealing to the reader’s
empathy? I would think so. The reader’s empathy and sense of outrage will carry most readers past the later descriptions of possible defects in the petitioner’s evidence, which do raise some questions
about whether the perpetrators of Cecaj’s persecution were acting on
behalf of or with the acquiescence of the Albanian government. Empathy will probably deflect all but the most skeptical readers from
questioning whether Judge Posner is correct to treat the BIA’s findings as errors of law.
It would be easy for a reader to conclude that Judge Posner feels
empathy for Cecaj, and he well may. But I think that is beside the
point, as Judge Posner would certainly agree. Instead, careful attention to the structure of this opinion suggests that the real target of
Judge Posner’s ire is the BIA judge. Perhaps that is why the facts are
written so vividly. The point may not be to save Cecaj so much as it is
to make the judge look clueless—reversibly clueless.
It is consistent with what we know about Judge Posner’s antimoralism to think that he is deploying his rhetorical skills here to
chastise institutional incompetence, not to save the oppressed of other nations. My point is not that Judge Posner should or should not
feel empathy or write in a way that inspires empathy. Instead, my
point is that readers and students should be careful about succumbfederal judges, has lost confidence in immigration law judges’ capacity for accurately
finding and evaluating facts or for interpreting and applying the law).
163
See Cecaj, 440 F.3d at 898–900.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 898.
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ing to a fallacy that Judge Posner has warned against: concluding that
one knows an author’s personal views from the moods his rhetoric
166
may inspire.
Even so sophisticated a reader as Martha Nussbaum temporarily
succumbed to the fallacy—perhaps from friendship and wishful
thinking. In a welcome essay on Judge Posner’s use of literary technique, she considered his narration of the facts in Carr v. Allison Gas
167
Turbine Division, a sex discrimination case. The case and the fact
narration bear some similarity to Cecaj. As in Cecaj, Judge Posner
writes in Carr to reverse the trial court’s findings of facts and so we
once again have occasion to see him devote more than ordinary care
168
to the facts. Carr was the first woman to work in the tinsmith shop
169
For five years her
of General Motor’s (GM) gas turbine division.
male coworkers subjected her to aggressive, hostile, sexualized, and
170
derogatory remarks, which Judge Posner quotes.
Carr fruitlessly
and repeatedly complained to her supervisor and finally sued GM for
171
sexual harassment.
Nussbaum compliments Judge Posner’s narration of the facts for
“considerable literary selectivity and skill,” in particular, his ability to
stimulate empathy in the reader for the plaintiff by techniques that
172
enabled the reader to perceive the situation from her point of view.
Nussbaum notes that Judge Posner accomplishes this with calm and
unsentimental prose, maintaining his position as the “judicious spec166

No one can fault Judge Posner for a lack of candor about his own jurisprudential stances or his approach to writing opinions:
[D]o not infer a judge’s jurisprudential stance from the judge’s style
without a consideration of both the content and form of the judge’s
opinions. Or the judge’s character. All that a choice of style infallibly
communicates is what the judge thinks an admirable character for a
judge to have.
Posner, supra note 22, at 1436. It is too bad that casebook editors provide few references to this sort of material.
167
32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994), discussed in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE:
THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 104–11 (1995); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1477, 1502–
09 (1995) [hereinafter Poets as Judges]. But see Martha Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After: Power and Sex in Carr v. Allison Base Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1831, 1831–44 (2007) [hereinafter Carr, Before and After] (reevaluating
Judge Posner’s approach to that case and criticizing his subsequent opinion in another sexual harassment case, Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l. Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.
1995)).
168
See Carr, 32 F.3d at 1009–10.
169
Id. at 1009.
170
Id. at 1009–10.
171
Id. at 1010.
172
Nussbaum, Poets as Judges, supra note 167, at 1505.
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173

tator.”
Judge Posner would never indulge in the likes of Justice
174
Blackmun’s “Poor Joshua!”
Several years later, however, Nussbaum expressed disappoint175
ment in Judge Posner, speculating that, despite his artful opinion
in Carr, his apparent understanding of sexual harassment had been
merely a visceral reaction to one particular set of facts and that, being
176
undertheorized, was not reliably sustained. That may be.
I think, however, that Nussbaum partially misunderstood Judge
Posner’s rhetoric in the first place. As he did for Cecaj, Judge Posner
inspired reader empathy for Carr on his way to zapping his real target—incompetence. The key to the reason for Judge Posner’s vivid
description of the harassment comes in the conclusion:
It is difficult for an employer to sort out charges and countercharges of sexual harassment among feuding employees, but we
are dealing here with a situation in which for years one of the nation’s largest enterprises found itself helpless to respond effectively to an egregious campaign of sexual harassment directed at
one woman. No reasonable person could imagine that General
Motors was genuinely helpless, that it did all it reasonably could
have done. The evidence is plain that it . . . was unprepared to
deal with problems of sexual harassment even when those problems were rubbed in its face, and also incapable of improvising a
solution. Its efforts at investigation were lackluster, its disciplinary
effort nonexistent, its remedial efforts perfunctory. The U.S.
Navy has been able to integrate women into the crews of warships;
General Motors should have been able to integrate one woman
177
into a tinsmith shop.

173

Id. at 1507.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 212, 213
(1989). Judge Posner debunks as “maudlin” Justice Blackmun’s opening line in his
dissent in DeShaney. Posner, supra note 22, at 1434. He castigates Justice Blackmun
for the “style” and especially the “voice” Justice Blackmun used in some “opinions in
which he expressed his heartfelt views” as “embarrassing performances precisely because they seem the unmediated expression of self.” Id.
175
Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After, supra note 167, at 1831–32. See also Mary
Anne Case, All the World’s the Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655 (criticizing Judge
Posner’s failure to perceive the harm in the defendant’s failure to provide toilet facilities to the sole female in an outdoor crew).
176
Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After, supra note 167, at 1840–41.
177
Nussbaum, Poets as Judges, supra note 167, at 1508 (quoting Carr v. Allison Gas
Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 1994)) (citations omitted). In fairness to Nussbaum, she understands the import of this particular passage as I do, quoting it and highlighting its satirical characterization of GM as
an effort to create “well-founded indignation and contempt” for GM’s behavior. Id.
at 1508–09.
174
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There is, then, a common subtext that one might gather from Cecaj
and Carr—Judge Posner’s impatience with institutional incompetence—and a cautionary lesson for students about inferring a judge’s
views from emotionally powerful rhetoric. In these cases, Judge Posner’s apparent concern for the plaintiffs’ plights may not have been
driven so much by empathy, much less by “moralizing” disapproval of
the abusers’ behavior, but by a pragmatic concern that is completely
in keeping with Judge Posner’s preference for efficiency and his dubiety that courts are competent to resolve messy social problems involving contested values. When institutions beneath the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, whether they are lower courts or corporations,
make mistakes that bring these messy social problems into the glare
of an appellate decision, he will be displeased.
C. Constructing an Authoritative Voice
The third lesson addresses possible effects of Judge Posner’s
178
writing “style” on students and their professional attitudes and
178

There is no consensus definition of literary “style,” not even with respect to a
distinction from content.
How are we to distinguish between what a poem says and the language
in which it says it? On the one hand, there is no such thing as a “content” which does exist quite apart from the words; on the other hand
the very existence of the word “style” shows that something can be said
about the words which does not refer directly to the content. The relation between the two must be described metaphorically; and looking at
the metaphors that have been used, we see that they are of two kinds.
The first suggest that the relation is mechanical, that [style] is something added, more or less at the poet’s discretion; if on the other hand
we see the relation as closer and more intimate, we are likely to use an
organic metaphor.
STYLE, in PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 814 (Alex Preminger ed.,
1974). Classical rhetoricians distinguished between “high” and “low” style and advocated for the use of particular styles for particular genres. Id. at 815. For instance, a
“high” style was appropriate for epic poetry, such as the Aeneid—“Aeneas should not
trudge out of Troy”—while a “low” style would be appropriate for satire. Id. We need
not revisit the merits of this largely defunct rule to be interested by Judge Posner’s
obvious resort on occasion to “low” style. Judge Posner’s Aeneas might very well
trudge. We must leave for another time an examination of the institutional significance of such a change. See supra note 22 (discussing Tiersma and Popkin).
For some recent examples of Judge Posner’s style, see Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 2007) (“‘Constructive
trust’ is legalese for seeking to wrest ownership of a thing from its nominal owner,
which is to say the holder of legal title. It is not a real trust; in law, ‘constructive’ often and here means ‘fictional.’”; “All this is a great muddle.”); Moran Foods, Inc. v.
Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436, 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There is a ‘for
want of a nail the kingdom was lost’ flavor to Mid-Atlantic’s theory of damages.”; “So
on to the merits.”). Judge Posner can be funny, at least if you are not the losing party: “It is curious to see an insurance company, in the role of insured, asking a court to
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tones. Judge Posner’s style, as you might expect of a judge writing
nearly a century later, differs markedly from Justice Cardozo’s. Justice Cardozo engaged in what Judge Posner calls “mannerism,” meaning a fondness for relatively complex sentence structures and hightoned diction. Judge Posner uses shorter, declarative, active-voice
sentences and colloquialisms common among well-educated English
speakers in the United States during the second half of the twentieth
179
century. Judge Posner calls his style “impure” to distinguish it from
the “pure” or “high” style of more conventional judicial writers:
Impure stylists like to pretend that what they are doing when they
write a judicial opinion is explaining to a hypothetical audience of
laypersons why the case is being decided in the way that it is.
These judges eschew the “professionalizing” devices of the purist
writer. . . . [devices such as] the unembarrassed repetition of obvious propositions, [and] the long quotations from previous cases
to demonstrate fidelity to precedent . . . . These and other devices constitute what Robert Ferguson has felicitously summarized
180
as the “rhetoric of inevitability.”

Writing of an opinion by Justice Holmes, Judge Posner praises the
ability to embed
the particular issue presented by a case in a much broader context, here consisting both of the common law tradition and of the
institutional role of courts in the scheme of American government, [that] is characteristic of great judges. It not only lends resonance to an opinion but also connects what may be a narrow
technical issue of interest only to lawyers—and often to precious
few of them—with concerns shared by a broader education public. . . . An opinion so crafted speaks in the language of the general intellectual community to that community. . . . And this ascent from a pinched professional discourse to a sunnier upland of
general culture can fairly be described as a stylistic characteristic
of the great judges. The pure style is an anodyne for thought.
The impure style forces—well, invites—the writer to dig below the
verbal surface of the doctrines that he is interpreting and applying. . . . [I]f the judge is lucky, he may find, when he digs bemake law adverse to insurance companies.” Farmers Auto. Ins. Assoc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 976, 977 (7th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, where the
parties are not evenly matched, Judge Posner’s wittiness can seem inhumane. For
example, in an appeal in a personal bankruptcy case involving whether the debtor
could shelter $2700 cash as “tangible” exempt property from the bankruptcy trustee,
witticism struck a decidedly heartless note: “We may seem to have wandered from the
point, which was not the metaphysics of money but the practical economies of debt
collection.” In re Oakley, 344 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 2003).
179
See Posner, supra note 22, at 1428–29.
180
Id. at 1429–30 (citing Ferguson, supra note 97, at 213–15) (citations omitted).
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neath the verbal surface of legal doctrine, the deep springs of the
181
law.

In the course of this paean to the impure style, Judge Posner lit into
an opinion by his co-panelist Patricia M. Wald as an example of the
182
“pure” style run amok—anodyne for thought, apparently. After describing the opinion’s meticulous use of a multi-factor test for an aggravated offense in a drug case, Judge Posner comments ungraciously
183
He
that the “style of the opinion retards the search for meaning.”
admitted that the opinion would be highly effective rhetoric if the
point were to uphold the lower court’s determination of an aggra184
He also acknowledged that the statute that authorvated offense.
izes punishing drug dealers more heavily for using guns in connec185
tion with their drug dealing is not senseless or inoperable, “[b]ut its
sensible application is not advanced by chanting a litany of relevant
186
factors.”
I think that Judge Posner’s discursive approach combined with
his colloquialism and the occasional “low” usage is not only vivid and
readily intelligible but has also become a “dominant” or authoritative
style. William Popkin has suggested, in another context, that the style
is “democratic,” by which Popkin must mean something like “sound187
That is an interesting insight, but Popkin’s
ing open-minded.”
choice of words is misleading. Judge Posner is not democratic; as a
judge, he could not be even if he were so inclined. Popkin’s better
point reflects an institutional insight: that federal judges can now afford to sound relaxed and engage with alternative analyses because
the authority of Article III courts is more stable and widely accepted
188
His political insight is
than it was earlier in the country’s history.

181

Id. at 1445, 1447.
Id. at 1442.
183
Id. (discussing United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
184
Id.
185
Posner, supra note 22, at 1442.
186
Id. at 1447; cf. Wald, Rhetoric of Results, supra note 25, at 1419. Wald, who had
contributed a thoughtful, and much less tendentious, essay on the challenges of writing opinions, was not pleased by Judge Posner’s unannounced use of Morris as a vehicle for opining on the superiority of the impure style, characterizing it as a “kamikaze style of discourse” neither “particularly useful or attractive.” Wald, Reply to Judge
Posner, supra note 25, at 1454 (noting that Judge Posner was really arguing about
theories of judging as much as about style). Bryan Garner, legal writing pundit, prudently avoids taking sides in this pure/impure debate. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER ON
LANGUAGE AND WRITING: SELECTED ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF BRYAN A. GARNER 429–30,
591 (2009).
187
POPKIN, supra note 22, at 169–71.
188
See id. at 169–78.
182
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that a modern judge like Judge Posner, who is skilled enough to engage in just the right measure of verbal caprice, actually increases his
authority by doing so. In contemporary culture, a skilled author can
gain authority from violating grammar rules and using slang and joking. The implied message is that he is so smart and so confident that
he need not cloak himself in the traditional high style of institutional
power. For all its informality, Judge Posner’s is a rhetoric of power
and a powerful form of rhetoric. Judges who plod dutifully through
their syllogisms signal deference to limited judicial roles, and perhaps
they also signal inability to do anything more creative with the materials handed to them. Not Judge Posner!
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. legal academy’s susceptibility to one of its own superstars raises the question of whether its traditional teaching materials
and “signature pedagogy” are up to the task of teaching students the
messages embedded in its selected texts. This disciplinary discourse
is self-referential. Judge Posner, without working in his judicial capacity, could take the record for any case on appeal and write a
“Judge Posner opinion” as instructional material. Or, he—and many
others—could simply write an essay describing what the judgment
should be and why, or discourse on any number of other topics, if
they had sufficient skill to keep the reader attentive. Given the traditions of legal education, however, Judge Posner’s inclusion in casebooks depends precisely on his status as a judge; his status removes
these opinions from the category of expressly didactic materials—
they represent “law.” Thus, editors and professors can teach these
materials mixed in with other opinions from other judges, jurisdictions, and eras and preserve a fiction—a fig leaf, really—that they are
simply presenting for students’ study just another example of an observable, external-to-the-academy phenomenon: judge-made law.
Again, as a result of our traditions, editors and professors feel no obligation to share with students much, if any, information about this
particularly deliberate and didactic author.
Unbeknownst to law professors who may not have studied literary theory, the practice of case study in law schools shares a methodology with the “New Criticism.” New Criticism is a literary theory that
dominated university English departments in the mid-twentieth century, and was the theory to which Judge Posner was exposed as an
undergraduate English major at Yale in the 1950s. One of the leading figures in New Criticism was Cleanth Brooks, then at Yale and
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189

with whom Judge Posner studied.
In a nutshell, New Criticism was
a reaction against the previous generation of literary criticism in
which fictional and poetic texts were examined in light of the au190
Influenced by psychoanalytic theories of the
thor’s life and times.
early twentieth century, earlier critical practices attended not only to
the text’s surface meaning but also supplemented such readings with
speculations, gleaned from biographical information, about the au191
To make a gross overthor’s unconscious purposes and meanings.
simplification, prior to the New Critics, both a text and its author
might receive substantially equal amounts of criticism. In contrast,
the New Critics advocated primary attention to the text on its own
terms and disapproved interpretations that depended upon an un192
derstanding of the author’s life and times.
In keeping with modernist and post-modernist literary and artistic theory, the New Critics
were less interested in the author’s intent, character, or historical
193
context, than in his text and the reader’s response to it alone.
Similarly, Legal Realism also developed at Yale in the 1920s. Its proponents, of course, took quite the opposite tack with respect to legal
texts, arguing, in part, that legal actors and institutions could only be
understood in the context of their backgrounds, historical, political,
194
and economic situations.
Despite the influence of Legal Realism in scholarship and some
195
recent efforts, like the Stories series, to give students a richer context
for cases, I think most classroom “Socratic” dialogue emphasizes the
kind of de-historicized, de-personalized analysis typical of New Criti196
cism, with one huge difference: law school dialogues rarely address
rhetorical strategies, per se. That is quite odd in a discipline and profession wedded to the interpretation of texts. In most classrooms, at
least in the formative first year, the text of an opinion is subjected to
a close reading for its statement of facts, its issue definitions, the legal
189

MacFarquhar, supra note 34, at 84.
See, e.g., NEW CRITICISM, in PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS
567–68 (Alex Parminger ed., 1974).
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See id.; CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN 236–38 (1975).
194
See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 29–30 (1986).
195
Foundation Press has published several volumes of background “stories” for
different doctrinal subject areas. See, e.g., CONTRACTS STORIES, supra note 91.
196
This is a coincidence, not cause and effect, because Langdell invented the case
method before New Criticism took hold. My point is that Judge Posner’s exposure to
New Criticism would make him more than unusually sensitive to the way in which legal education suppresses the significance of the author judge in favor of a purported,
but rather superficial, engagement with text.
190
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principles invoked, and the rationale and background of important
cases and, rarely, some information about the court and the judges
who decided the case—but that kind of information is not the norm
and is generally not the principal focus of classroom discussion. Sel197
dom is any history, intellectual or political, included. Instead, judicial opinions are presented as doctrinal artifacts whose meaning as
“law” can and must be extracted by law students through close attention to the text with minimal reference to the life, times, or agendas
of their authors. Cases are organized by legal issue, not by the court,
the jurisdiction, or the era. While students may read several opinions
by the same judge—especially Judge Posner—they will not read them
together and, thus, the authorial attitudes and styles of any given
judge will be less apparent. Of course, this disregard of the author’s
role is not simply a borrowed conceit from literary theory. It is
rooted in ideology: the goal that judges should be objective and neutral. Although practitioners and academics all know that, in practice,
the judge matters a great deal—even if he or she is striving to be objective and neutral by whatever criterion—our teaching materials
(except perhaps for constitutional law) subordinate discussion of that
person’s views and their authorial techniques to exploration of doctrine.
I have suggested that law schools’ reception of Judge Posner’s
opinions casts doubt on our traditional efforts to shelter doctrine
from author and context. While some of what I have written may
seem critical of Judge Posner, in truth I am awed by his accomplishment—much of it achieved through his mastery of rhetoric. To teach
this judge’s work and to ignore his rhetorical strategies is, if nothing
else, to miss an opportunity to improve law students’ rhetorical sensitivity and facility. Beyond this, I have suggested that attention to rhetorical analysis of judicial opinions is one way to reintroduce author
and context and, in the process, enrich the intellectual content and
practical utility of classroom instruction. Rhetorical analysis makes
visible the type and caliber of a judge’s craft, it permits discussion of
her implicit assumptions, it invites consideration of her integrity, and
it permits discrimination between the form of an argument and its
merits.
In conclusion, I suggest that law professors seriously consider
whether dependence on casebooks, at least as most are currently con197

The advent of supplements like the Law Stories series from Foundation Press is
welcome, but those materials aim to provide context for the parties and their dispute, and to reverse the radical, factual, and emotional decontextualization of an
appellate opinion. There is less focus on judges.
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stituted, might be a bad habit. That reading appellate judicial opinions may be a questionable way to learn to be a lawyer in the United
States is not a novel argument. That anthologizing a substantial
number of Judge Richard Posner’s opinions in introductory casebooks and then teaching them in an undifferentiated mix with other
opinions might reveal an under-theorized discipline and pedagogy is
a new argument. To teach with so little attention to author, context,
and rhetoric seems an odd way to go.

